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INTRODUCTION
Richard Posner caused a stir in 2017 when he advocated for a
mandatory retirement age of 80 for federal judges.1 His comments
were particularly pointed, given the retirement rumors that swirled
around Justice Anthony Kennedy (then aged 80), and Posner’s
simultaneous attacks on the intellectual quality of current and
former members of the Supreme Court.2 While Posner was being
characteristically provocative, his proposal would not be unique in
our legal regime, which is full of age-based rules.3 The Constitution
has no fewer than four age requirements for voting and running for
elected office.4 Federal regulations use age as a factor in
determining criminal sentences as well as Social Security Disability
benefits.5 And at the state level, age is used to determine when you

1 See Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner, & Jed S. Rakoff, Should There Be Age Limits for
Federal Judges?, SLATE (July 5, 2017, 5:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/should_there_be_age_limits_for_federal_judges.html
(“[T]here should be mandatory retirement for all judges at a fixed age, probably 80 . . . . There
are loads of persons capable of distinction as Supreme Court justices; no need for
octogenarians.”).
2 See id. (“Anyone think there’s a giant or giantess on the Supreme Court today?”). To his
credit, Posner retired before his own age cutoff. See Jason Meisner & Patrick M. O’Connell,
Richard Posner Announces Sudden Retirement from Federal Appeals Court in Chicago, CHI.
TRIB. (Sep. 1, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-judge-richardposner-retires-met-20170901-story.html.
3 See JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION 4 (2006) (“Age distinctions, age
stratifications, age judgements (sic), and ‘age-appropriate behaviours’ are subtly woven into
our patterns of thinking, as a way of making sense of the world.”).
4 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years”); id. at art I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years”); id. at art II, § 1 (“[N]either shall any
Person be eligible to that Office [of President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
five Years”); id. at amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age.”).
5 See 21 U.S.C. 859(a) (2012) (doubling the penalty if the perpetrator is above eighteen
and distributed a controlled substance to someone younger than twenty-one); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2010) (“Age (including youth) may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted”); see Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20
C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (2008) (describing the guidelines that incorporate age in
evaluating eligibility for benefits).
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can enter into contracts,6 get married,7 or have sex.8 The
government is permitted to draw these types of age distinctions
because they are subject only to rational basis review under the
Equal Protection constitutional regime.9
At the same time that legal rules extensively employ age,
antidiscrimination statutes prohibit its use in a variety of domains.
For example, federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
age in any program receiving federal financial assistance as well as
in private employment decisions.10 Many states prohibit age
discrimination in housing as well.11 In 2017, the California
legislature tried to prevent the Internet Movie Database from
publishing actors’ ages so as to inhibit the use of that information
in hiring decisions.12 Age-based legal regulation even affects online
dating. In early 2018, a court ruled that Tinder, the smartphone
dating app, could not discriminate against people over thirty by
charging them more for expanded in-app services.13
Despite this widespread incorporation of age into the law and the
contrasting legal rejection of private age discrimination, theorists
have devoted scant attention to age as compared to other socio-legal
6 See RICHARD A. LORD, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the
contractual age of majority in various jurisdictions).
7 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West 2016) (setting the age to marry at eighteen);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.010 (West 2018) (requiring that individuals be seventeen to
marry); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.101 (West 2017) (setting the marriage age at eighteen).
8 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (West 2018) (setting the age of consent at
eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West 2018) (setting the age at seventeen);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.364(10) (West 2017) (setting the age at eighteen).
9 See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96–97 (1979) (finding mandatory retirement for
foreign service officers at age sixty permissible under the Equal Protection Clause); Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (holding that police officers over the age of
fifty did not constitute a suspect class).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (prohibiting age discrimination in “any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance”); 29 U.S.C. §623 (2012) (prohibiting age-based
employment discrimination).
11 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2017) (prohibiting the refusal to sell
or rent because of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (West 2016) (same).
12 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83.5 (West 2017) (“A commercial online entertainment
employment service provider . . . shall not . . . (1) Publish or make public the subscriber's date
of birth or age information in an online profile of the subscriber.”). This law was ruled
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. IMDB.com v. Becerra, No. 16-cv-06535-VC,
2018 WL 919031, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018).
13 See Candelore v. Tinder, Inc., No. B270172, 2018 WL 580246, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
29, 2018) (concluding that this age distinction was contrary to law because it constituted “an
arbitrary, class-based, generalization about older users’ incomes”).
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categories, such as race, class, or sex.14 This is unfortunate, as age
is a salient social trait that is distinct from other identity categories
in interesting and important ways. On the one hand, age is
considered immutable because it is outside one’s control, similar to
race or sex.15 On the other hand, it is also clearly mutable—like
religion, class, and disability—because one’s age changes over
time.16 Unlike these other mutable characteristics, however, age’s
mutability is deterministic rather than being a consequence of
choice or chance. In other words, people inevitably age.17 Thus, any
legal rules that incorporate age inherently implicate either our past,
present, or future selves.18 These traits give age a unique temporal
character, which influences determinations of when age-based
distinctions might be wrongful.
Most discrimination scholars base their moral theories of
discrimination—i.e. why discrimination is wrong and why the law
should intervene to prevent that wrong—on the value of equality.19
14 See Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Racial Horizons and Empirical Landscapes in the Post-ACA
World, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 493, 504 (noting how age receives less attention than other
categories such as race, class, and gender). Ageism, too, remains understudied. See Michael
S. North & Susan T. Fiske, An Inconvenienced Youth? Ageism and Its Potential
Intergenerational Roots, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 982, 982 (2012) (“[S]urprisingly scant research
examines age-based prejudice, compared with racism and sexism.”).
15 See Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 32–33 (1979) (noting that an age-based rule “classifies individuals on
the basis of a characteristic that is immanent and inescapable to them, one suggestive of
neither culpability nor demerit”).
16 Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a
Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 236 (2010).
17 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 129–30 (2003)
(“After all, it is not too far off the mark to observe that all of us fall into one of two categories:
we are either old or hoping to get there.”).
18 See JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES 18–20 (1996)
(describing how time renders the self heterogeneous).
19 This makes sense insofar as equality exerts a steady influence on Western thought and
the language of equality appears in the Constitutional text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”);
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 3 (1992) (“[T]he major ethical theories of social
arrangement all share an endorsement of equality in terms of some focal variable, even
though the variables that are selected are frequently very different between one theory and
another.”); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693, 697
(2000) (“The norm of equality, with its distinctive logic and force, has powerfully shaped the
analysis of a range of critical social issues . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality:
A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 575 (1983) (“No value is more thoroughly
entrenched in Western culture than is the notion of equality.”).
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While capable of many formulations, equality is at its core a
comparative value, which means that the wrong of discrimination
derives from the differential treatment one person receives as
compared to another similarly-situated individual.20 The dominance
of this comparative method in discrimination law has led some to
call the field “equality law.”21
The central claim of this Article is that equality can neither
adequately describe the moral wrong of age discrimination nor
justify the current landscape of statutory age discrimination law. 22
Equality fails to pinpoint the moral wrong of age discrimination in
a wide range of cases because the relevant comparator in the
analysis is always simultaneously someone of a different age as well
as a past or future self.23 In other words, age-based rules and private
age discrimination will inevitably apply to everyone if they are
fortunate to live long enough. Thus, it makes little sense to complain
of unequal treatment—being denied the right to vote until age
eighteen or being forced to retire at age eighty—so long as everyone
is treated equally over their lifetimes.24 Time serves to cure these
momentary instances of age discrimination, whereas it does not do
so for other forms of discriminatory treatment.
Thus, we must turn to non-comparative values, such as liberty or
dignity, to flesh out the theoretical foundation of age discrimination
law. Non-comparative values locate the wrong of discrimination in
its violation of some continuous right or interest, regardless of
whether or not other people are similarly deprived.25 The
20 See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 900 (2016)
(“According to the comparative conception of discrimination, we determine whether X has
suffered wrongful discrimination by looking at the treatment X has received . . . and
comparing it to the treatment accorded to at least one other individual . . . .”).
21 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1993–
97 (2017) (arguing for expanding equality law beyond antidiscrimination approaches); Noah
D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (2017)
(analyzing equality law as if it were antidiscrimination law).
22 This Article is not the first to question the value of equality or to contrast it with noncomparative approaches. For example, Peter Westen famously critiqued equality as lacking
substantive content and as engendering intellectual confusion. See generally Peter Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). This Article does not engage in such
a wholesale critique of equality. The narrower focus is on how equality falters in pinpointing
the moral wrong of age discrimination due to age’s unique temporal character.
23 See infra Part II.A.
24 See infra Part II.B.
25 See infra Part III.
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substantive content of this interest may be fleshed out in various
ways, such as access to fundamental human capabilities,26 the
freedom to deliberate free of costs imposed from morally irrelevant
traits,27 or the ability to avoid opportunity “bottlenecks.”28 For the
purposes of grounding a theory of age discrimination, it only
matters that these entitlements are conceptualized noncomparatively. These types of interests must generally be respected
at all points in time, avoiding the temporal problems of a
comparative equality analysis.29 Thus, in evaluating whether an
age-based legal rule or private action wrongfully discriminates, we
must focus our inquiry on the intrinsic wrongfulness of deprivation
rather than the relative wrongfulness of comparison.
This Article is a scholarly contribution on three fronts. First, it
illuminates the moral foundation of age discrimination law, which
remains largely undertheorized in the legal and philosophical
literature.30 This theoretical foundation is useful for explaining the
current state of Equal Protection jurisprudence with respect to age.
It also serves to normatively ground age discrimination statutes
that are currently on the books. Second, it intervenes in the nascent
and vigorous debate among discrimination scholars on the

26 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 76–78 (2006) (detailing a list of ten fundamental human capabilities).
27 See Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 147 (2010) (“In
a liberal society, . . . we are each entitled to a set of ‘deliberative freedoms,’ freedoms to
deliberate about and decide how to live in a way that is insulated from pressures stemming
from extraneous traits of ours.”).
28 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 13 (2014)
(defining a bottleneck as “a narrow place in the opportunity structure through which one
must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals”).
29 See Geoffrey Cupit, Justice, Age, and Veneration, 108 ETHICS 702, 708–09 (1998) (“Thus
even if (eventually) everyone’s turn to be discriminated against on grounds of age comes
around, it does not follow that such discrimination is just. All that follows is that the injustice
does not arise from the comparison of one person’s lot with another’s.”).
30 See Juliana Bidadanure, Discrimination and Age, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 243, 245 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed. 2017) (“[I]ssues of
age-based inequalities in general and age discrimination in particular remain undertheorized.”); Pnina Alon-Shenker, The Unequal Right to Age Equality: Towards a Dignified
Lives Approach to Age Discrimination, 25 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 243, 244 (2012)
(“[T]here is no comprehensive theory of age discrimination that would explain when and why
age-based distinctions are wrongful.”); Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1813, 1813–14 (1996) (claiming that “the
normative foundation of the ADEA remains uncertain” and accepting that “the ADEA cannot
be justified on traditional distributive or rights-based grounds”).
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theoretical foundation of discrimination law more generally.31 By
demonstrating that some non-comparative value is necessary to
identify the moral wrongfulness of at least one type of
discrimination, it lends support to a more pluralist vision of
discrimination law.32 Third, it adds to the new and growing
literature examining the role of time and temporal analysis in legal
scholarship.33 In addition to these theoretical contributions, this
intervention is also well-timed. With the aging of the population and
renewed interest in intergenerational justice among the young, agebased rules and antidiscrimination statutes will inevitably come
under further scrutiny.34 We must understand their conceptual
foundation in order to better evaluate whether they should be
maintained, scaled back, or expanded going forward.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides the
theoretical background for the argument. It examines age as a sociolegal category, defines discrimination, and describes the dominant
egalitarian theories of discrimination law. This sets the stage for
Part II, which argues that age’s temporal dimension renders
egalitarian theories unable to identify the moral wrong of many
forms of age discrimination. This helps to explain constitutional
Equal Protection jurisprudence, which is not protective of age.
However, it also highlights that we lack both a descriptive account
of why statutory law operates to prohibit age discrimination and a
See Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 1 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) [hereinafter
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] (noting that the philosophical discussion of issues in
discrimination is a “relatively young field of inquiry”).
32 See infra Part III.C.1.
33 See generally ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME (2018) (viewing time
as an essential element of our political economy); FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE
TIMING OF LAWMAKING (2017) (examining how legislative and judicial functions should be
influenced by timing); Mark Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J. (forthcoming)
(empirically evaluating when people execute wills); Elise C. Boddie, The Contested Role of
Time in Equal Protection, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1825 (2017) (examining how time intersects
with remedies for race discrimination); Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives,
68 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2016) (exploring the temporal dimension in sexual consent); see also Adam
B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 372 (2007) (assessing
the temporal frame for understanding voting rights violations).
34 See Mark Mather et al., Aging in the United States, 70 POP. BULL. 1, 2–3 (2015) (noting
that those aged 65 and over are projected to total almost 100 million by 2060); David
Leonhardt, Old vs. Young, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/
opinion/sunday/the-generation-gap-is-back.html (noting intergenerational tension with
respect to political beliefs, economic opportunities, and social practices).
31

OF
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normative account of why and when the law should do so. Part III
fills this gap by sketching out the contours of a non-comparative
approach to age discrimination law and discusses some of its
notable implications for discrimination theory and the legal
regulation of age.
I. AGE AND DISCRIMINATION
This Part provides the background for the Article’s central
arguments. Section A examines age, ageism, and age-based law.
Section B explores the concept of discrimination and how the value
of equality and its comparative method underlie many theories of
discrimination law.
A. AGE

Age is a numerical measure of time since birth.35 The state’s
extensive birth records allow for easy verification of one’s birthdate
and thus one’s age.36 While this lends age an air of objective fact,
there is nothing intrinsically informative about age as such.
Advances in science have demonstrated that various biomarkers
such as telomere length may provide a better picture of one’s
physical state.37 Aging itself is characterized by diversity rather
than homogeneity, as genetic differences interact with varied life
35 Chronological age is a convenient starting point for this project, but it does not exhaust
the definitions or meanings of age. Age has biological, psychological, and social dimensions
as well. See Richard A. Settersen, Jr. & Bethany Godlewski, Concepts and Theories of Age
and Aging, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF AGING 9, 9–14 (Vern L. Bengtson & Richard A.
Settersen, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2016) (discussing how chronological age is often used as a proxy to
measure other attributes). These are important for analyzing how discrimination operates,
but chronological age is the basis of age-based law and thus is central to the legal analysis.
36 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2002) (“States maintain a smorgasbord of public
records, covering one’s life from birth to death.”). At the margins, there might be problems of
evidence for individuals who do not have adequate documentation of their age. See, e.g., Ross
Pearson, Note, What’s My Age Again? The Immigrant Age Problem in the Criminal Justice
System, 98 MINN. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (2013) (describing how many immigrants may lack
birth records due to lack of registration in the country of origin).
37 See, e.g., Paola Sebastiani et al., Biomarker Signatures of Aging, 16 AGING CELL 329,
333–36 (2017) (exploring the relationship between various biomarkers and aging); Jason L.
Sanders & Anne B. Newman, Telomere Length in Epidemiology: A Biomarker of Aging, AgeRelated Disease, Both, or Neither?, 35 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 112, 123 (2013) (concluding that
telomere length is associated with aging).
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experiences to give vastly different content to peoples’ lives, even if
they might be the same age.38 Further, age derives much of its
meaning from social processes and cultural contexts.39 That being
said, age is not subjectively determined either. Individuals might
not “feel” their age, but they would not be able to plausibly claim
that they are indeed a different age, even if they might describe
themselves as an “old soul” or “young at heart.”
It is precisely age’s numerical nature and verifiability—its
administrability—that makes it so attractive for use in the law.40 As
a matter of form, perhaps the most frequent use of age in legal
directives is its inclusion in bright-line rules as a triggering fact.41
For example, age plays a major role in demarcating the transition
from childhood to adulthood in both the public and private
spheres.42 On the public side, age-based rules determine when you
can vote,43 sit on a jury,44 obtain a driver’s license,45 stay outside at
night,46 or legally drink alcohol.47 In the private realm, age

38 See Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 468
(1997) (noting that “most current literature rejects the decline and failure paradigm of normal
aging, concluding that both cognitive and physiological changes occur in varying degrees and
at individuated rates”).
39 See MACNICOL, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“A basic truism of gerontology is that age per se is
meaningless: it is always mediated through social processes and cultural attitudes.”).
40 See Howard Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 860 (1981)
(“Rather than a program administrator having to engage in the time-consuming and costly
exercise of determining whether a given individual does or does not fit into a programmatic
charter, he can rely upon a clear, indisputable fact—the age of the person involved.”).
41 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (noting that rules “bind a decisionmaker to respond . . . to the presence
of delimited triggering facts”).
42 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 62 (2016)
(“Childhood and adulthood are also socially and legally constructed statuses whose meanings
have varied dramatically over time and across cultures.”).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012) (requiring the federal jurors be “a citizen of the United
States eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district”);
see, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 494.425 (West 2016) (setting the age at twenty-one); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-1601 (West 2016) (setting the age at nineteen).
45 See GDL Requirement by State, INSURANCE INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY
LOSS
DATA
INST.
https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/graduatedlicensestatelaws?
stateabbr=AK (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (collecting different states’ requirements).
46 See, e.g., CHICAGO, IL. MUN. CODE § 8-16-020 (2017) (creating an offense if a minor stays
“in any public place . . . within the city during curfew hours”).
47 See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (restricting federal funds to states that have a drinking age
below twenty-one).
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determines when you can consent to sex,48 make medical decisions
involving your own body,49 get married,50 emancipate yourself from
your parents’ control,51 or enter into contracts.52 Age is used to
impose responsibilities as well. All males must register for the
selective service at age eighteen,53 which is also the age at which the
state may execute you for committing serious crimes.54
Age-based law is not limited to bright-line maturity rules,
however, and it extends into almost every field of law. It appears in
criminal law, defining the scope of crimes such as elder abuse,55 and
determining the length of criminal sentences.56 It structures health
law, notably through the provision of the Affordable Care Act that
permits adult children to stay on their parents’ health care plans
until they are twenty-six.57 It is used in tax law through the
provision of a higher standard deduction to those who have turned
sixty-five.58 Zoning laws often employ age-based rules to create a

48 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2015) (establishing eighteen as the age of
consent); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West 2011) (establishing seventeen as the
age of consent); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.354(10) (West 2017) (establishing eighteen as the
age of consent).
49 See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical
Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 427–32 (2002) (discussing the different attempts
by states to actualize minor medical decision-making).
50 See Marriage Laws: Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage (last visited Mar. 2,
2019) (listing the various age requirements to get married with and without parental consent
throughout the United States).
51 See Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037 (N.J. 1982) (noting that the “attainment
of an appropriate age” is one way in which emancipation may occur).
52 See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 9:3 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the contractual age of majority in various jurisdictions). You
cannot, however, enter into a contract with a credit card company until you turn twenty-one.
15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) (2012) (“No credit card may be issued to, or open end consumer credit
plan established by or on behalf of, a consumer who has not attained the age of 21 . . . .”).
53 See 50 U.S.C. § 3803(a) (Supp. IV 2012) (setting an age range of eighteen to twenty-six
years for selective service).
54 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the death penalty cannot
be imposed on juvenile offenders).
55 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-32.3 (West 2018) (“A person is guilty of abuse if that
person is a caretaker of a[n] . . . elder adult . . . and . . . (i) assaults, (ii) fails to provide medical
or hygienic care, or (iii) confines or restrains the . . . elder adult in a place or under a condition
that is cruel or unsafe . . . . [An elder adult is a] person 60 years of age or older . . . .”).
56 See supra note 5.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2012).
58 See 26 U.S.C. § 63 (2012) (“The taxpayer shall be entitled to an additional amount of
$600—(A) for himself if he has attained age 65 before the close of his taxable year . . . .”).
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supply of housing for an older adult population.59 In family law, age
is a factor in calculating alimony awards at divorce and in
determining appropriate parents for adoption.60 Further, Social
Security Disability regulations employ age in the award of disability
benefits, making it easier to qualify for them if you are older, even
with the same level of impairments.61
This panoply of legal rules highlights the other reason for age’s
extensive use in the law, which is that it serves as a vessel for
substantial social meaning.62 Age is socially salient, ranking among
the first identity characteristics that we notice about each other.63
It functions as a convenient basis for social judgments and decisionmaking, primarily as a proxy for a variety of target variables of

59 See 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 23:30 (4th ed.
2017 Supp.) (“[M]any municipalities [have enacted] zoning ordinances that provide for
development wherein permanent residency is restricted to senior citizens, [leading] many
private developers to develop similar communities governed by age-restrictive restrictive
covenants.”).
60 See Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Altenbernd, J.,
concurring) (“In my own mind, the factor of age weighs more heavily in favor of permanent
alimony when the spouse requesting permanent alimony is approaching fifty.”); Marsha
Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary
Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 486 (1996) ( “[O]nly three variables—the wife’s age,
her health, and marital duration—were significantly correlated with the decision to award
alimony for an unlimited time period.”); see also In re ASF, 876 N.W.2d 253, 263 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2015) (declaring that consideration of the adoptive parents’ ages did not violate the law);
In re Baby Boy P., 664 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (1997) (noting that “the age of the prospective
adoptive parents is one factor that may be considered” even if it is not decisive).
61 See supra note 5.
62 See GAIL WILSON, UNDERSTANDING OLD AGE: CRITICAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 17–
19 (2000) (discussing different cultural understandings of age); Liat Ayalon et al., Macro- and
Micro-Level Predictors of Age Categorization: Results from the European Social Survey, 11
EUR. J. AGING 5, 14–16 (2014) (describing the various ways in which attitudes towards age
and aging differ across individuals and societies).
63 See Bernice L. Neugarten et al., Age Norms, Age Constraints, and Adult Socialization,
70 AM. J. SOC. 710, 710 (1996) (“In all societies, age is one of the bases for the ascription of
status and one of the underlying dimensions by which social interaction is regulated.”). It is
this salience that contributes to the wrongfulness of age discrimination and makes age a good
candidate for regulation through antidiscrimination laws. See KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN,
BORN FREE AND EQUAL?: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION
30–36 (2014) (arguing for the importance of social salience in defining wrongful
discrimination); see TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 95–96 (2015)
(incorporating salience into the relative disadvantage condition for the norm of discrimination
law).
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interest.64 Based on an individual’s age, we might assume that a
person is wise or immature, well-versed in technology, or going
through some kind of age-based “life crisis.”65 It helps people
evaluate who “looks good for their age” and is an essential descriptor
on dating apps that allows users to determine whether someone is
acceptable as a potential mate.66 The use of age extends to the
professional sphere, with doctors using it to evaluate whether
patients have reached an age at which screening for certain
conditions is recommended, such as mammograms for breast
cancer.67 Age also has normative force, regulating conduct through
the delineation of age-appropriate beliefs or behavior.68 At times,
this may lead to age being used as the basis for treating others
poorly, such as denying them housing, employment opportunities,
or medical care.69
This raises the specter of ageism, defined as prejudice,
stereotyping, or discrimination on the basis of age or perceived
age.70 While ageism is often discussed in reference to older people,
64 See Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten,
86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) (“[P]roxy discrimination is merely a tool used to identify a
class of persons or things with a different identifying trait, the ‘target.’”).
65 See, e.g., Lynda Gratton & Andrew Scott, Our Assumptions About Old and Young
Workers Are Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/ourassumptions-about-old-and-young-workers-are-wrong. Conversely, we might infer what a
person’s age is based on certain characteristics we associate with certain ages.
66 See Mary Ward, Have Dating Apps Made Age More Important Than Ever Before?, THE
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 14, 2017), http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-andrelationships/have-dating-apps-made-age-more-important-than-ever-before-20171005gyuvta.html (“Imagine if you walked into a bar and everyone was wearing a name tag that
instantly told you how old they were. That’s what using Tinder is like. But it’s weirder,
because you’ve walked into the bar and everyone isn’t just wearing age tags: everyone above
and below your selected age range isn’t there.”).
67 See Kevin C. Oeffinger et al., Breast Cancer Screening for Women at Average Risk, 314
J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1, 2 (2015) (“[W]omen with an average risk of breast cancer should
undergo regular screening mammography starting at age 45 years (strong
recommendation).”).
68 See HOWARD EGLIT, ELDERS ON TRIAL: AGE AND AGEISM IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 7 (2004) (“Age also functions informally as a powerful normative device for
influencing—and sometimes dictating—attitudes and conduct . . . . ‘Act your age’ is a common
admonition reflecting this phenomenon . . . .”).
69 See ERDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE 119–151 (1999) (collecting
instances of ageism in the economy, government, family, housing, and health care).
70 See Thomas Nicolaj Iversen et al., A Conceptual Analysis of Ageism, 61 NORDIC
PSYCHOL. 4, 15 (2009) (“Ageism is defined as negative or positive stereotypes, prejudice and/or
discrimination against (or to the advantage of ) elderly people on the basis of their
chronological age or on the basis of a perception of them as being ‘old’ or ‘elderly’. Ageism can
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it can be directed at any age group.71 For example, beliefs that young
people are inherently irresponsible or that older adults’ bodies are
disgusting are both ageist. Just as with racism or sexism, ageism
can be explicit or implicit.72 It operates at multiple levels, as
individuals, social networks, institutions, and culture can all be
ageist.73
The
behavioral
component
of
ageism—age
discrimination—imports a normative element into its definition.
This is precisely the topic that this Article seeks to illuminate by
examining what transforms benign differential treatment based on
age into wrongful discrimination and how this should be addressed
in the legal sphere. To perform this analysis, it is necessary to delve
deeper into age’s particular characteristics.
Age is a unique socio-legal category that shares select features
with several other identity characteristics.74 Age, like race or sex, is
considered to be immutable in the law, even if these categories are
more unstable than the law might suggest.75 Nevertheless, while
be implicit or explicit and can be expressed on a micro-, meso- or macro-level.”). While this is
the most comprehensive definition of ageism in the literature, it requires further tweaking to
acknowledge that ageism may be directed at any age group, not just the elderly.
71 See North & Fiske, supra note 14, at 17 (“Though its focus usually connotes prejudice
toward older people, the word ageism naturally includes people discriminated against at any
age); Jack C. Westman, Juvenile Ageism: Unrecognized Prejudice and Discrimination Against
the Young, 21 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 237, 240–46 (1991) (describing manifestations
of institutionalized ageism against children).
72 See Maria Clara P. de Paula Couto & Dirk Wentura, Implicit Ageism, in AGEISM:
STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 37, 48–51 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2d
ed. 2017) (comparing implicit and explicit measures of ageism).
73 See JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE:
INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND SEXISM 12–14 (1978) (contrasting an individual view of racism
and sexism with an institutional analysis).
74 See Stewart J. Schwab & Garth Glissman, Age and Disability Within the Scope of
American Discrimination Law, in DISABILITY AND AGING DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES IN
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 145, 154 (Richard L. Wiener & Steven L. Willborn, eds. 2011)
(describing how age compares to sex, race, and disability on the dimensions of definitional
ease, visibility, empathy, legality, political clout, and size).
75 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, (1973) (“[S]ex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”). Age,
too, is an accident of birth, specifically when said birth was. While this represents the legal
consensus, the reality is more complex. Race is socially constructed and malleable, subject to
contestation and judicial adjudication in particular cases. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW 10TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 8 (2006) (“Race is not,
however, simply a matter of physical appearance and ancestry. Instead, it is primarily a
function of the meanings given to these. On this level, too, law creates races.”). Sex is similarly
subject to contestation by transgender, genderqueer, and nonbinary individuals, who eschew
the sex classifications applied to them at birth. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
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some individuals may be able to “pass” as a different age, you cannot
choose your own age, nor can you speed up or slow down the
progression of time.76 On the other hand, age also shares with traits
like religion, class, and disability that it is mutable.77 In other
words, one’s status within the identity category can change
throughout the lifecourse. Just as people convert religions,
experience class mobility, or suffer accidents that leave them with
impairments, so too do people age and obtain membership in
progressively older age groups. However, age differs from these
other mutable characteristics in that it is inevitably mutable.78 One
may or may not change religions, but it is certain that we will all
become older as time passes. Finally, age, like these other traits, is
morally irrelevant.79 Moral irrelevance in this context means that a
characteristic does not have a relationship to entitlement or desert,
nor does it constitute a person as morally superior or inferior.80
While age certainly possesses unique characteristics, it is worth
noting that age does not exist in a vacuum. Other traits, such as
class, disability, gender identity, race, religion, sex, or sexual
orientation, intersect with age to produce different types of lived

Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714–716 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (involving a transgender boy who wanted access to boys
restrooms); Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 392 (2017)
(describing the increasing forms of sex/gender identification).
76 See JOHN A. VINCENT, INEQUALITY AND OLD AGE 97 (1995) (“Ageing is a biological
process that happens to all of us from the moment we are born. It is a continuous process.”).
77 See Kohn, supra note 16, at 236 (“Chronological age is mutable in the sense that it
changes over time.”).
78 See Jan Baars, Concepts of Time in Age and Aging, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AGING 69, 71–72 (Geoffrey Scarre ed., 2016) (noting how chronometric time
is both exact and continuous).
79 This is not entirely uncontroversial. There is a view, commonly associated with nonWestern cultures, that advanced age in fact enhances one’s status. See Cupit, supra note 29,
at 714–18 (exploring the “veneration thesis” and concluding that age may in fact enhance
moral status by virtue of its entailing that there is more to us as historical beings). This view
would at best support age discrimination in favor of the aged, not age discrimination tout
court. In addition, it is not clear that it holds much sway in the United States context; respect
for the aged may in fact derive from more utilitarian grounds that are easily confused with
the belief that age enhances status. See id. at 715.
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 800 (1993) (“A
difference is morally irrelevant if it has no relationship to individual entitlement or desert.”);
see also Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 117 (1998) (“[I]t is indisputable that race and gender
are ‘morally irrelevant,’ in the sense of not constituting persons as inferior or superior . . . .”).
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experiences.81 Further, the intersection of ageism with
discrimination on the basis of other identity characteristics can
create particular forms of disadvantage that are unique and more
pernicious than just the compound disadvantage that one might
experience from each characteristic individually.82 For example,
consider the intersection of sex and age in Hollywood. While age is
not necessarily a problem for aging male actors, who continue to
find work and roles, older women lack such opportunities.83 This is
directly related both to the sexist judgment of women by their
appearance, but also by the ageist judgment that youthfulness is
attractive and agedness is not.84 In this context, these two forms of
prejudice combine and reinforce one another.85
Whether discrimination derives solely from age or from age in
combination with other characteristics, the time is ripe for an
inquiry into the moral foundations of age discrimination law. The
population is aging, with those older than sixty-five projected to

81 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA BILGE, INTERSECTIONALITY 2 (2016) (“[P]eople’s
lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped
not by a single axis of social division, be it gender or race or class, but by many axes that work
together and influence each other.”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory,
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40 (noting the need to center the
experiences of those at the intersections); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 768 (1994) (noting how intersectionality allows for those
at the intersections to be recognized as “proper legal subjects”).
82 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 708 (2001) (noting that “systems of discrimination—e.g., racism, sexism,
homophobia, and classism—are themselves intersectional”).
83 See Ann Hornaday, Hollywood Ageism Punishes Actresses, But the Art House Offers
Some Hope, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/
hollywood-ageism-punishes-actress-but-the-art-house-offers-some-hope/2017/03/09/
ce7e0e24-040c-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html (“[T]here’s no doubt that women are far
more affected by the movie industry’s obsession with sex appeal and physical beauty,
resulting in a giant absence in female roles once actresses reach their 50s and 60s.”).
84 See TONI CALASANTI & KATHLEEN F. SLEVIN, GENDER, SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, AND AGING
54 (2001) (“[A]geism interfaces with sexism to put pressure on women to be a particular shape
and size, to portray a youthful image even if old.”).
85 See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the
Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 27 (1995) (“The lessons of anti-essentialism
and intersectionality are that the oppressions cannot be dismantled separately because they
mutually reinforce each other.”). The intersection of ageism with other forms of disadvantage
would not be news to early theorists of ageism. See Robert N. Butler, Age-Ism: Another Form
of Bigotry, 9 THE GERONTOLOGIST 243, 243 (1969) (using an intersectional example of lowincome, black, senior citizens to illustrate ageism, the term he coined).
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total almost 100 million by the year 2060.86 The age-based rules that
apply to those at the older end of the age spectrum will thus have
increasing effect, allocating social resources and shaping attitudes
about the appropriate content of various life stages.87 In addition,
there is increasing interest among younger segments of the
population in intergenerational justice, especially as many perceive
that current economic conditions offer fewer opportunities to
millennials than previous generations.88 We must understand the
conceptual foundation for age-based laws and antidiscrimination
statutes in order to better evaluate whether they should be
maintained, scaled back, or expanded going forward.
The next Section explores discrimination, antidiscrimination
law, and the role of equality in understanding both.
B. DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination is a multilayered concept. At a basic level, it is
simply the practice of drawing distinctions or engaging in
differential treatment.89 Individuals discriminate in this sense all
the time, for instance by choosing one style of clothes over another.
Used in this way, being “discriminating” can be seen as a positive
trait, as it represents the ability to differentiate between goods of
higher or lower quality, such as in the realms of food or art.90
However, the word discrimination has a value-laden meaning as
well. At this normative level, discrimination is the morally wrongful
drawing of distinctions or differential treatment.91 The central
Mark Mather et al., supra note 34, at 2–3.
See STEPHEN KATZ, DISCIPLINING OLD AGE: THE FORMATION OF GERONTOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE 60–69 (1996) (discussing how the legal creation of pensions served to structure
our understanding of the life-course). Further, intergenerational issues must be addressed in
various settings, such as the workplace. See, e.g., Michael J. Urick et al., Understanding and
Managing Intergenerational Conflict: An Examination of Influences and Strategies, 3 WORK,
AGING & RETIREMENT 166, 168 (2016) (describing how the presence of multiple generations
in the workplace can lead to heightened tension).
88 See Leonhardt, supra note 34 (“Younger adults are faring worse in the private sector
and, in large part because they have less political power, have a less generous safety net
beneath them.”).
89 See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 2 (2008) (discussing when
it is and is not permissible to draw distinctions between people).
90 See id. (“Someone who is astute and has a subtle mastery of his subject is often described
as ‘discriminating,’ . . . .”).
91 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 63, at 24–25 (terming this the “moralized concept
of discrimination”).
86
87
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inquiry here concerns what, if anything, makes age discrimination
morally wrongful.92 In other words, when is it wrong to treat
individuals differently on the basis of age? Answering this question
does not exhaust all the possible normative arguments about age
discrimination, nor is that the goal.93 However, it does flesh out one
of the most important normative arguments—the moral one—for
assessing when it is appropriate to incorporate age into the law or
enact laws against age discrimination.94
Antidiscrimination laws confer certain rights against
discrimination upon individuals. These laws have four essential
components that are useful to define the scope of the current
discussion:
They provide [1] certain grounds (race, sex, age, etc.) on
which distinctions should not be made [2] by certain
persons (maybe public authorities, legislatures or
maybe anyone at all) when dealing with [3] certain
people (employees, applicants for jobs, tenants, citizens,
etc.) [4] in respect of certain benefits or burdens (jobs,
houses, access to the courts, etc.).95
This Article is concerned with the ground of age, and with
distinctions drawn by either public or private entities. Public age
discrimination is the wrongful use of age classifications by the state
through its legislative, judicial, and executive branches.96 In
contrast, private discrimination is wrongful differential treatment
by individual actors.97 This Article does not seek to reopen
constitutional debates on the appropriate level of scrutiny for age;
however, the argument presented in Part II helps illuminate why
See id.
Other normative arguments for or against age discrimination or age discrimination law
might operate in a different normative register. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth
Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 780 (1997) (arguing that the age antidiscrimination law is a mismatch
with the situation of older workers); Jolls, supra note 30, at 1829–30 (justifying age
discrimination laws on the basis of economic efficiency).
94 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 63, at 103 (“By claiming that something makes an
act of discrimination wrong, . . . I mean that it is a feature of the action that counts as a
reason in favor of its being impermissible to perform.”).
95 Elisa Holmes, Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality, 68 MOD. L. REV. 175, 182
(2005).
96 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8
(1991) (discussing the public/private distinction in the context of discrimination).
97 See id.
92
93
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those debates settled in the way they did.98 Finally, this Article is
concerned with anyone who is subject to age discrimination,
whether young or old, with respect to the variety of substantive
fields in which it occurs.
There are two main sources of antidiscrimination law. The first
is the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, which denies the
government the ability to engage in certain forms of distinctiondrawing.99 The Supreme Court long ago held that age-based
classifications are only subject to rational basis review, making
most age-based law permissible.100 The second source of
antidiscrimination law is statutory. There are a number of statutes
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of age.101 One of the most
salient at the federal level is the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, which prohibits many employment decisions based solely on
age for those over the age of 40.102 Similarly, the Age Discrimination
Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in any program
receiving federal financial assistance.103 While at the federal level,
age has not been included in the Fair Housing Act, some states have
explicit age-based antidiscrimination protections in the realm of
housing.104 Additionally, age is sometimes read into the relevant
state antidiscrimination statute even if age is not explicitly
mentioned.105
Most scholars see antidiscrimination laws and norms as
grounded in the value of equality.106 Equality is capable of many
See infra Part II.B.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
101 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s age . . . .”).
102 See id.
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (“[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of age,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012) (including a variety of identity categories but omitting
age); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2017) (prohibiting the refusal to sell or
rent because of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (West 2016) (same).
105 See, e.g., Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (noting that while age is not explicitly protected in the statute, age discrimination may
still contravene it under certain circumstances).
106 See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 21, at 1367 (analyzing equality law as if it were
antidiscrimination law); John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in
98
99
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meanings, but, at its core, it is inherently comparative. In order to
evaluate whether the dictates of equality are satisfied, one must
compare her situation to that of another person who is similarly
situated.107 While there is a general consensus on this value
foundation and comparative method, there is significant
disagreement among discrimination theorists about what feature of
the equality-based comparison is relevant and which conception of
equality is operative in demonstrating the wrongfulness of that
feature. In other words, there is disagreement about what version
of equality is relevant for the discrimination analysis and which
feature of differential treatment transforms it into wrongful
discrimination.108
Under the equality umbrella, there are three general camps.109
First, there are those who are focused on intent. These thinkers
draw upon the concept of moral or basic equality, or the notion that
each person has equal moral worth and deserves equal respect and
concern.110 On this view, when an actor engages in differential
treatment, it is wrongful to the extent that such treatment is the
result of a morally defective attitude that some are worthier than
others, or deserving of more or less respect and concern.111

Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2586 (1994) (exploring
equality in the employment discrimination context); see also SEN, supra note 19, at 3 (“[T]he
major ethical theories of social arrangement all share an endorsement of equality in terms of
some focal variable, even though the variables that are selected are frequently very different
between one theory and another.”).
107 See Hellman, supra note 20, at 900 (“According to the comparative conception of
discrimination, we determine whether X has suffered wrongful discrimination by looking at
the treatment X has received . . . and comparing it to the treatment accorded to at least one
other individual.”).
108 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 63, at 1.
109 See id. at 7–8 (understanding the three general categories as mental state, objective
meaning, and harm).
110 See JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1–2
(2017) (terming this form of equality “basic equality”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (describing “the right to treatment as an equal, which is the right, not
to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same
respect and concern as anyone else”).
111 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 192 (1992) (“Biases—except for those
reflecting close personal ties that are so central to one’s identity they amount to “biases” in
favor of one-self—are paradigmatically intrinsically immoral. Biases rest on erroneous
judgments of others’ inferior moral worth.”).
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This type of prejudice can make private acts of discrimination
wrongful, but it can also taint legal rules if such prejudice animates
or infects the democratic process.112 This understanding of the
wrongfulness of public discrimination developed in the context of
Equal Protection jurisprudence, specifically footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products.113 It reads: “[P]rejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”114 Thus,
when legislators actualize their prejudice in the public sphere by
targeting minorities for disadvantageous legal treatment, it reveals
that those legislators do not think those minorities are worthy of
equal concern and respect.115 This represents a breakdown in the
democratic process as there is inadequate representation of
minority interests, which justifies judicial review.116 Accordingly,
there is a strong emphasis on discovering the “mental state” of
Congress when it passes such discriminatory rules.117
The second camp of equality theorists focuses not on the intent
of the actor, but on what is communicated by the differential
treatment.118 These expressive accounts also draw upon the idea of
112 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 158
(1980) (discussing when generalizations are suspect based on “who came up with it and
whether it serves their interests”).
113 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
114 See id.
115 See ELY, supra note 112, at 82 (noting that Equal Protection “preclude[s] a refusal to
represent [minorities], the denial to minorities of what Professor Ronald Dworkin has called
‘equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that
govern them.’”); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLTICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS,
DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 57 (2017) (“The right to moral equality entails not only
that government may not deny to any human being the status of citizenship based on the
view (or on a sensibility to the effect) that she is morally inferior; it also entails the right to
equal citizenship.”).
116 See ELY, supra note 112, at 136 (“Benefits . . . that are not essential to political
participation or guaranteed by the language of the Constitution, we can call constitutionally
gratuitous . . . and malfunction in their distribution can intelligibly inhere only in the process
that effected it.”).
117 See id. at 136–45 (discussing the difficulties of discerning legislative and administrative
motivation); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (discussing the
importance of discriminatory purpose in assessing the constitutionality of laws).
118 See Hellman, supra note 20, at 33 (“Discrimination is wrong when it demeans . . . . What
[this requires] is that laws, policies, and practices not draw distinctions among people in a
way that treats some as less worthy than others, however that is interpreted in that
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basic or moral equality.119 According to these assessments,
discrimination is wrong when it demeans, where demeaning
treatment expresses the idea that another does not possess equal
moral worth.120 The act of demeaning has both a social dimension
and a power dimension.121 The social dimension requires
establishing that a specific act is a particularly serious or extreme
expression of disrespect toward another within a particular cultural
and historical context.122 The power dimension requires that the
person or entity engaging in the differential treatment hold a
position of power with respect to the object of the act, as demeaning
involves someone higher in the power hierarchy targeting someone
lower in it.123 The government clearly qualifies as it has the coercive
power of the state behind it, but other entities or individuals might
as well, such as an employer who has power over employees or a
landlord who has power over tenants.124
The third group of egalitarian theorists shifts the focus of the
analysis to the negative and unequal consequences of differential
treatment. The basic logic of this family of theories is that
discrimination is wrongful when it harms on the basis of morally
irrelevant characteristics.125 Scholars in this camp are perhaps the
most diverse, often appealing either to distributive equality (the
culture.”); Patrick Shin, The Substantive Principle of Equal Treatment, 15 LEGAL THEORY
149, 166 (2009) (arguing for a similar moral analysis of how “treatment can be interpreted
for purposes of determining whether it is objectionable”).
119 See Shin, supra note 118 (referring to basic notions of morality in analyzing the broad
concepts of discrimination and differential treatment).
120 See HELLMAN, supra note 89, at 33 (“To demean is to treat another as less worthy. In
this sense, demeaning is an inherently comparative concept . . . . This account neither reduces
equality to an entitlement to a specific good or right nor leaves it empty of bite or content.”).
121 See id. at 36 (describing several dimensions of the act of demeaning).
122 See id. (defining the social dimension of “demeaning” others).
123 See id. at 35 (discussing several examples of power relationships changing the meaning
of a given act).
124 Cf id. at 57 (“Individual actions are less likely to demean than actions by institutions.
This is because governments and institutions generally have more status and power than
private individuals.”).
125 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 63, at 154–55 (“The harm-based account of the
wrongness of discrimination says that an instance of discrimination is wrong, when it is,
because it makes people worse off, i.e., they are worse off given the presence of discrimination
than they would have been in some suitable alternative situation in which the relevant
discrimination had not taken place.”); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1979) (“Because race is not
a factor indicating anything about the moral worth of persons, race is morally irrelevant to
state laws and policies.”).
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idea that benefits and burdens should be distributed equally in
society) or social or relational equality (the view that society should
be free from hierarchical relationships or beliefs of moral
superiority).126
Further, this group of theorists highlights different aspects of the
harm in the discrimination analysis.127 Some emphasize harms of
distribution, or how discrimination produces unequal allocations of
resources or opportunities.128 Others focus on the harms of
recognition, which are “rooted in social patterns of representation,
interpretation, and communication.”129 Early writers in this vein
saw the primary harm as one of stigma, or the psychological effects
of unequal legal and cultural treatment.130 While these various
harms may accrue to individuals, many of these theories expressly
base the wrong of discrimination in how it negatively affects social
groups, which can affect the temporal equality analysis.131 One
highly influential view articulates this as an “anti-caste principle,”
which objects to discriminatory rules when they have the effect of
transforming “highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into
systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for
society to do so.”132

126 See IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1 (2015) (Egalitarianism is “a class of distributive
principles, which claim that individuals should have equal quantities of well-being or morally
relevant factors that affect their life”); Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL
EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21, 21–22 (Carina Fourie et al. eds., 2015)
(distinguishing between distributive equality and a relational or social view of equality).
127 See
NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
“POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 13–14 (1997) (describing different types of harm).
128 See id. (describing the many forms of socio-economic injustice that these harms
represent); see also Re’em Segev, Making Sense of Discrimination, 27 RATIO JURIS 47, 59–64
(2014) (arguing that discrimination is wrongful when it results in distributive injustice).
129 FRASER, supra note 127, at 14.
130 See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1976) (“Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference
inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior.”); see also IYIOLA
SOLANKE, DISCRIMINATION AS STIGMA: A THEORY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 84 (2017)
(“[T]he anti-stigma principle should be informed not only by structures of power, but also by
patterns of consequences, so as to accommodate the difference between those stigma that will
be protected by anti-discrimination law and those that will not.”).
131 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
147–56 (1976) (advancing a group-disadvantaging principle); infra Part II.B.3 (analyzing how
group-based theories may evade the temporal question).
132 Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411–12 (1994).
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The moral wrongfulness of a given act of discrimination serves
as the normative foundation for the prohibition of certain legal
classifications or the legal regulation of private discriminatory
conduct.133 However, it is merely one factor in deciding how to
structure the law. While the wrongmaking feature identified by a
discrimination theory may make a certain instance of differential
treatment wrongful all other things being equal, there may be other
normative considerations that counsel against legal intervention.134
For example, consider an individual who discriminates on the basis
of race in the selection of romantic partners.135 While this might be
morally wrongful, most would balk at the suggestion that the law
intervene to prevent discrimination in this domain. Romantic
partner selection is typically shielded from state intervention
because maintaining a sphere of privacy in personal decisionmaking may be morally worthwhile as a general rule.136
Even if an act or rule is morally wrongful all things considered,
it may be impractical for the law to intervene. Taking the example
above, it would be quite difficult and costly for the state to police
romantic partner selection for the entire population. In this case,
the moral wrongfulness may be better addressed by cultural rather
than legal interventions.137 Thus, while the moral wrongfulness of a
particular form of age discrimination weighs in favor of its legal
regulation, such regulation is not a foregone conclusion.
This Part has examined the socio-legal category of age, which
possesses unique temporal qualities. It has also surveyed
discrimination law theory, which typically relies on the value of
equality. This value requires a comparative method to establish the
See Brest, supra note 130, at 5.
See, e.g., Axel Gosseries, What Makes Age Discrimination Special? A Philosophical Look
at the ECJ Case Law, 43 NETH. J. L. PHIL. 59, 79–80 (2014) (considering some of the
additional arguments about why differential treatment based on age may be acceptable).
135 See generally CHRISTIAN RUDDER, DATACLYSM: LOVE, SEX, RACE, AND IDENTITY (2014)
(reporting on data from OKCupid that indicated strong racial and age preferences in the
dating market); see also Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, LGBT Equality and Sexual
Racism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2739, 2742 (2018) (defining these preferences as “sexual
racism”).
136 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
137 See generally LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE
CHANGE (2016) (discussing various methods of cultural change).
133
134
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wrongfulness of discrimination, which in turn serves as the basis
for an antidiscrimination law or norm. The next Part brings these
two strands together, making the case that incorporating a
temporal analysis into the subject of age discrimination reveals the
significant weaknesses of equality-based theories.
II. EQUALITY AND TIME
Age discrimination is typically seen as less pernicious than other
forms of discrimination.138 This Part offers an argument why: Once
the temporal aspects of age are considered, egalitarian theories of
discrimination prove unable to identify the moral wrong of age
discrimination in many cases. This should not be taken as an
argument that there is in fact nothing wrong with ageism and age
discrimination. Instead, it is meant to demonstrate that equality
alone cannot form the theoretical foundation of this area of law
precisely because it does not have the necessary conceptual
resources to isolate the wrong of ageism and age discrimination. To
the extent that age discrimination is wrong, we must understand its
wrongfulness in terms of other values.
Section A begins by describing how an egalitarian analysis
requires answering the temporal question of when the comparative
analysis should take place. It further presents the consensus
answer to this question in philosophy—that the lifetime of the
individual is the relevant temporal unit of analysis. Section B
explores how this renders many equality-based theories of
discrimination law incapable or compromised in recognizing any
wrongfulness in age-based differential treatment. As a descriptive
matter, this explains the current Equal Protection jurisprudence on
age, which explicitly relies on the value of equality. Section C
describes the situations in which equality might still decry age
discrimination, though these fail to capture many cases of age
discrimination. Therefore, equality is insufficient to justify the
138 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
205, 222 (2004) (“[T]he prohibition on age discrimination in employment does not have
anything like the same moral standing as the corresponding prohibitions on race and sex
discrimination.”); Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Analogizing
Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 852 (2004)
(noting that age discrimination “does not elicit the same universal agreement that age
distinctions are immoral”).
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current statutory antidiscrimination regime or to ground an
understanding of the wrongfulness of age discrimination more
generally.
A. THE TEMPORAL QUESTION

Because equality is a comparative value, it requires an analysis
of at least two objects to allow that comparison to proceed. Courts
have focused on the “Who?” element of the comparison. In deciding
antidiscrimination cases, many courts and legal commentators have
tried to determine whether a comparator is required for a successful
antidiscrimination claim and who the appropriate comparator
might be.139 Philosophers have focused on the “What?” element of
the comparison. In examining whether a particular outcome is just
according to the value of equality, the key question is what we are
trying to equalize—resources, utility, capabilities, or something
else?140
Age forces us to explore the under-examined “When?” element of
the comparison.141 The central question is this: what should be the
temporal unit of analysis for equality? Specifically, in evaluating
differential treatment, do we assess whether that treatment
comports with equality based on a moment in time or over a longer
time period? The lifetime egalitarianism approach posits that the
complete life of an individual is the morally relevant temporal

139 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) (noting that “side-by-side comparisons”
of black and white jurors would be relevant to ascertaining race discrimination in jury
selection pursuant to a Batson challenge); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804 (1973) (noting that employee comparators would be helpful in establishing employer
motive); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 748 (2011)
(“Comparators become relevant to the analysis, then, because they help expose—whether in
the single- or mixed-motive analysis—that ‘likes’ have been treated in an ‘unlike’ fashion and
give rise to the inference that discrimination is the reason for that differentiation.”).
140 See G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 906 (1989)
(“What aspect(s) of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians .
. . ?”); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 195,
197 (1979) (initiating the debate on equality of what?); see also Amartya Sen, Capability and
Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 270, 283 (Daniel M.
Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the different currencies of well-being).
141 See PETER LASLETT & JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND
GENERATIONS 1 (1992) (noting that the “revival of political theory over the past three decades
has taken place within the grossly simplifying assumptions of a largely timeless world”).
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unit.142 Thus, there must be equality over the complete lifetimes of
separate individuals.143 At any given moment in time, there might
be inequalities between individuals, but these may be allowed,
justified, or perhaps even required to ensure equality over
lifetimes.144
The main alternative to lifetime egalitarianism is the time-slice
approach.145 This family of views holds that the relevant temporal
unit of analysis is something shorter than entire lifetimes. Thus,
egalitarians should be concerned about inequalities that manifest
in either simultaneous slices of time across lives, corresponding
slices of time within each life, or non-temporally-ranked slices of
time within each life.146 In other words, those momentary
inequalities that are permitted or required in lifetime
egalitarianism should instead be seen as morally troubling.147
142 See LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 233 (1993) (“[O]n a complete lives view, an
egalitarian should be concerned about A’s being worse off than B to the extent, and only to
the extent, that A’s life, taken as a complete whole, is worse than B’s, taken as a complete
whole.”).
143 See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES 117–139 (2004) (arguing for the separability of
lives).
144 See NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS’ KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND OLD 83–95 (1988) (defending age rationing in health care and employment in
situations of scarcity based on his Prudential Lifespan Account, a Rawlsian interpretation of
the lifetime view); see also MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION:
BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 430–42 (2012) (arguing for lifetime prioritarianism).
145 See Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 ETHICS 475, 491 (1989) (“Our lives are
lived serially through time, and the simultaneous segments view responds to this fact by
valuing equality in the simultaneous parts of lives rather than by merely requiring that lives
should be equal when viewed timelessly as completed wholes.”).
146 See TEMKIN, supra note 142, at 233 (describing simultaneous segments egalitarianism
(where simultaneous time slice segments are the moral unit of concern), and corresponding
segments egalitarianism (where corresponding time slice segments—youth, middle age, old
age, for example—of an individual’s life are the moral unit of concern)); Kasper LippertRasmussen, Measuring the Disvalue of Inequality over Time, 69 THEORIA 32, 36 (2003)
(adding a third time-slice view of non-time based segments egalitarianism, in which segments
of life are compared using some non-temporal measure, such as peaks or lows of welfare).
147 Those who argue against the lifetime view often use examples of extreme inequalities
in slices of time to illustrate their point. See, e.g., DENNIS MCKERLIE, JUSTICE BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND THE OLD 6–7 (2013) (describing a wealthy apartment complex next to a retirement
home whose residents live in squalor); TEMKIN, supra note 142, at 235–36 (describing how a
hypothetical God allows two versions of Job to possess vastly different levels of welfare, only
to have their positions switch at the midpoint of their lives). These examples undoubtedly
capture some egalitarian intuitions, though these intuitions may derive from violations of
relational, rather than distributive equality. See, e.g., Juliana Bidadanure, Making Sense of
Age Group Justice: A Time for Relational Equality?, 15 PHIL. POL. & ECON. 234, 245 (2016)
(noting that what might worry us about such examples is “not that there is a time-slice
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Most philosophers have accepted or assumed that the complete
life of an individual is the morally relevant temporal unit.148 There
are at least four reasons why this is the case. First, the lifetime view
has a certain intuitive and administrative appeal. We often consider
our lives as having a “narrative unity,” with meaningful
relationships between different temporal segments that make up
our story.149 This is also reflected culturally at the time of death,
when the relevant question is whether a person had a good life
rather than a good part of a life.150 This tendency towards lifetime
thinking is reflected in a vexing problem for the time-slice approach,
which is its difficulty in pinpointing a sub-lifetime period that is
morally relevant—one hour, one month, one year, one decade?151 As
a practical matter, if the length of time is defined to be very short,
we ignore many of the contextual facts that might be relevant to
assessing equality. For example, if the relevant time slice were one
hour, and it happens that one individual had to have a root canal
inequality in distribution as such, but rather that relationships of inequality may pertain at
all times”). Alternatively, as this Article suggests, it may be that these examples demonstrate
a different problem, which is that these examples represent violations of a non-comparative
value such as liberty or dignity.
148 See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 69 (1991) (“Remember that the subject
of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at some
time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death.”); R. I. Sikora,
Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distribution Schemes, 99 ETHICS 492, 502 (1989)
(arguing that from various differing perspectives individuals should prefer the lifetime view);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283,
304–05 (1981) (describing the goal as equality of resources across the lives of each person);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78 (1971) (claiming that individuals behind the veil of
ignorance would make decisions based on the long-term life prospects that they might face).
149 See HELEN SMALL, THE LONG LIFE 95 (2007) (“‘[N]arrative unity’ tends to be understood
non-literally, and simplifyingly, as a matter of there being significant connections between
the different temporal parts or stages of a story and by analogy a life. . . .”). This is reinforced
by the psychological interconnectedness of different parts of our lives, such that we might
experience pleasure or dread while imagining the future, which affects us in the present. See,
e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 972 (1999) (discussing the dread effects
of environmental contagion).
150 See Connie S. Rosati, The Story of a Life, 30 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 22–23 (2013) (noting
how we understand our lives in complete narrative form).
151 See Juliana Bidadanure, On Dennis McKerlie’s “Equality and Time,” 125 ETHICS 1174,
1177 (2015) (“One problem is that [simultaneous segments egalitarianism] may seem to
define the segments that matter (T1, T2, and T3) arbitrarily. In theory, we may always select
smaller segments in which case defining the worse-off would become arbitrary By contrast,
complete lives egalitarians seem to have identified the least arbitrary segment to apply the
value of equality to: the segment of a life.”).
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that hour, we might be required to compensate her for the pain and
cost of that procedure and ignore that others might go through the
same experience the next day.152 As the unit of analysis becomes
larger, the conceptual distinction between the time-slice and
lifetime views is diminished, and we lose the ability to capture
inequalities at moments in time.153 Whatever size segment is
chosen, it will likely be morally arbitrary yet have significant effects
on evaluating equality between individuals.154 The lifetime view
provides a simpler and more elegant solution.
A second reason why the lifetime view might be superior is
because it incorporates a desirable compensation principle. This
principle embodies the notion that inequalities in one segment of a
person’s life can be compensated for in another part of that person’s
life.155 For example, putting in hard work at law school while taking
on student loan debt could be worthwhile if it enhances one’s
employment and earning prospects for the rest of one’s life.156 Or a
couple might adopt a rule that each partner would be able to choose
which movie to watch on Fridays in alternating turns. This rule
represents an inequality in power each Friday, but this inequality
disappears over time in a way that most egalitarians would find
acceptable. In contrast, the time-slice view would only accept
compensation if it occurred within the same temporal segment.
Thus, it would fail to recognize longer-term life plans that involved
tradeoffs in well-being at different parts of the lifecourse.
Third, the lifetime view recognizes the importance of history.
Consider two individuals who experience vastly different life
circumstances for the first seventy years of their lives, and each

152 See MCKERLIE, supra note 147, at 483 (using the dentist example but not finding it
damning).
153 Id.
154 See Larry S. Temkin, Determining the Scope of Egalitarian Concern: A Partial Defense
of Complete Lives Egalitarianism, 69 THEORIA 46, 55–59 (2003) (critiquing time-slice
approaches for arbitrariness that has a large effect on evaluations of equality).
155 See KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, LUCK EGALITARIANISM 154 (2016) (arguing that the
possibility of compensation is a benefit to the lifetime view); Dennis McKerlie, Justice
Between the Young and the Old, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 152, 154 (2001) (discussing the
compensation principle).
156 See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 249, 284 (2014) (finding that “a law degree is associated with an increase of
approximately 84 percent in expected mean monthly earnings . . . , a 65 percent increase in
mean hourly wages . . . , and reduced risk of unemployment or underemployment”).
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have one decade left to live. The first has had a life full of
opportunities, happiness, and resources, while the second has
experienced health problems, social isolation, and poverty through
no fault of her own. According to the lifetime view, we should not
treat these two individuals equally in the last decade of their
lives.157 Rather, we should try to better the situation of the second
individual to account for what she has been through, in an attempt
to achieve equality over their lifetimes. The time-slice view might
force us to ignore that historical context, which potentially inhibits
societal efforts to recognize and address persistent inequalities.
Finally, the lifetime view allows for some consideration of
personal responsibility and choice.158 Many versions of
egalitarianism prefer distributive equality between people except
when inequalities are due to voluntary choices made by those
people.159 Consider another two individuals. Both experience
roughly equal and good lives in terms of welfare, but one individual
decides on a whim to sell all her possessions and spend the money
on lottery tickets. She does not win the lottery, leaving her destitute.
If we assess these two individuals solely at this point in time, or
within only a narrower temporal frame, we would have to bring the
second person back to equality with the first. For those who care
about incorporating some notion of desert or responsibility into
distributions (and not all egalitarians do), lifetime egalitarianism
allows for that.160
For these reasons, in evaluating differential treatment from the
perspective of equality, it is necessary to evaluate whether such
157 See MCKERLIE, supra note 147, at 477–478 (noting that the history of two individuals’
lives “will partly determine which present action would do best at achieving equality”
between the two individuals).
158 See Paul Bou-Habib, Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the Lifetime View, 37 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 285, 288 (2011) (“It is widely accepted among theorists of justice that a
person’s claims of distributive justice at a given moment in time should sometimes reflect her
earlier exercises of responsibility.”).
159 See SHLOMI SEGALL, WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS: LUCK EGALITARIANISM, ITS MEANING
AND VALUE 23–24 (2016) (defending equality as intrinsically valuable so long as inequalities
derive only from the fault of one’s own actions); Larry Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the
Levelling Down Objection, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 126, 129 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew
Williams eds., 2000) (“[Egalitarians] care about undeserved, nonvoluntary, inequalities,
which they regard as bad, or objectionable, because unfair.”).
160 See MCKERLIE, supra note 147, at 31 (“So it seems that, to give the proper weight to
facts about choice and responsibility, we must be prepared in principle to consider the past
and the future when assessing a present inequality.”).
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treatment leads to equality across the entire lives of separate
individuals. This may at first seem to be in tension with a
traditional legal analysis, which naturally adopts a time-slice
approach by analyzing the outcomes of individual cases.161 However,
cases help to form legal rules that will impact parties and
controversies in the future beyond that case. The broader temporal
perspective is useful for examining whether legal rules accomplish
over time the more substantive policy goals for which they were
designed. This is particularly important in the discrimination
context, as the pernicious effects of discriminatory laws and private
actions might only be revealed when one examines how they impose
cumulative disadvantage on members of particular social groups
over time.162
Thus, age’s temporal dimension requires us to expand our
analytical window when engaging in the comparative exercise.
When considering the wrongfulness of a given age-based legal rule,
we must examine how that rule will apply through time to the
lifecourses of all individuals who would live long enough to see its
application. When considering the wrongfulness of private
differential treatment based on age, we must examine how that
treatment would apply to that individual or other individuals at
ages across the lifespan. The next Section examines how lifetime
egalitarianism affects equality-based theories of discrimination.
B. LIFETIME EGALITARIANISM

The Supreme Court first seriously engaged with age-based legal
rules in the case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.163
This case involved a Massachusetts state law that required
mandatory retirement of police officers at age fifty.164 Robert
161 See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV.
517, 520–41 (1991) (describing the institutionalization of the case method in legal teaching).
162 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 487 (2007) (“[E]ven rational acts of discrimination can aggregate
to cause systematic and cumulative disadvantage to members of minority groups.”); Brest,
supra note 130, at 8 (“[B]ecause acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns,
their victims suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries.”); see also
Anne L. Alstott, A New Deal for Old Age, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1936 (2017) (noting how
earning a low income disadvantages you across the life-course).
163 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
164 Id. at 311.
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Murgia challenged the law, and there was no dispute that his
“excellent physical and mental health still rendered him capable of
performing the duties of a uniformed officer.”165 While noting that
the aged faced discrimination, the Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny to the class of police officers over fifty, saying that “even
old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group in need of
‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’
Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span.”166 As a result, the mandatory retirement rule passed
constitutional muster under rational basis review.167 Other similar
age-based constitutional challenges have also failed.168
The Court did not spend much time on the temporal dimension
of age, but the above quote reveals that the Court implicitly
embraced a lifetime egalitarian approach.169 Since the Court was
constrained by its consideration of age distinctions in the context of
constitutional jurisprudence, however, it did not engage with the
moral wrongfulness of age discrimination in egalitarian theories of
discrimination. The next subsections explicitly engage in that
missing analysis, concluding that the rational basis level of scrutiny
adopted by the Court was likely appropriate from the perspective of
equality.
1. Intent
Age-based differential treatment or legal rules might offend
equality because they are infected with ageism. In this context,
ageism refers to its prejudice or stereotyping components, which
have the quality of not respecting the equal moral worth of

Id.
Id. at 313–14.
167 Id. at 314
168 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (mandatory retirement for judges at
70 falls within exception of ADEA and does not violate equal protection); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 95 (1979) (mandatory retirement for foreign service officers at age 60 permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause). However, some state courts have struck down age
distinctions under rational basis review. See, e.g., Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of
Admin., Teachers’ Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Mont. 1993) (striking down a retirement
benefit age distinction).
169 See Eglit, supra note 40, at 888–89 (discussing how the Court employed a logic of
complete lives).
165
166
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individuals in society.170 According to this line of argument, what
makes differential treatment by private actors morally wrongful is
that it is animated by this ageist mental state. However, ageism
differs from racism and sexism in that it is composed of temporally
triggered biases that have equal application across all individuals’
lifetimes.171 For example, consider an employer who believes that
people in their twenties are unreliable because of their age and as a
result refuses to hire them.172 This seems to treat people of that
disfavored age as unworthy, which in turn taints the refusal to hire.
However, widening the temporal lens reveals that this mental state
does in fact respect the equal moral worth of persons, as the
aforementioned employer would presumably consider hiring the
same individuals as they age.173
A comparison to other identity characteristics helps to illustrate
the point. A racist attitude does not expire as applied to a given
individual, unless one has the privilege to “pass” from one racial
category to another unbeknownst to the individual possessing the
racist attitude.174 Therefore, the lifetime view reveals that
differential treatment animated by racism will generally yield
continuous discrimination over the lifetime of one person as
compared to another.175 This is lifetime inequality, not equality.
Differential treatment animated by religious bias, while potentially
170 See supra Part I.A. (discussing ageism); Part II.B.1. (discussing intent-based theories of
discrimination).
171 See Reaves, supra note 138, at 851–52 (noting the differences between ageism and
racism in the employment discrimination context).
172 See Caroline Beaton, Too Young to Lead? When Youth Works Against You, FORBES (Nov.
11, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinebeaton/2016/11/11/too-young-to-lead-whenyouth-works-against-you/ (describing how workers under thirty can face discrimination based
on age).
173 Cf Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Age Thirty: Where
It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 676 (1997) (“Ageism
is not equivalent, either in its genesis nor its manifestations, to racism.”).
174 See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) (“Passing—the ability of
individuals to change race—powerfully indicates race’s chosen nature.”); see also Khaled A.
Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282, 347–52 (2017)
(examining transracialism and its relationship to reverse passing); Rebecca Tuvel, In Defense
of Transracialism, 32 HYPATIA 263, 264 (2017) (considering the phenomenon of racial
transition and comparing it to the transgender experience).
175 See, e.g., John Wooldredge et al., Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on
Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 212–17 (2015)
(noting the negative effects for black defendants at various stages of the criminal process).
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more mutable like ageist bias, does not inevitably change in
application to a given individual, as conversion is neither required
nor guaranteed. Thus, in contrast to age, this yields lifetime
inequality as well.
In the realm of public discrimination, the argument from intent
takes on a slightly different character. What matters here is that
ageism taints the political process, producing normatively
objectionable outcomes that do not equally represent the interests
and concerns of age minorities in a democracy. When one observes
the age-based legal landscape, it does appear that a nontrivial
number of age-based rules reflect ageist stereotypes: those younger
than twenty-one are presumed unable to drink alcohol
responsibly,176 those under twenty-five are presumed to lack the life
experience to serve as Representatives,177 and those who are fifty
and older are presumed incompetent to serve as police officers.178
Further, age-based rules typically concern the youngest or oldest
members of society, who are numerical minorities.179 This suggests
that ageism may have infected the political process, and these
groups’ interests have not been adequately represented.
The unique temporal character of age, however, also complicates
any analysis of the political process as ageist. Ageism not only
represents negative attitudes and feelings towards other people, but
also represents prejudice against one’s past or future self.180 This
176 See Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking: Does Current Policy Make Sense?, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2006) (discussing the policy rationales for the drinking
age being to protect minors and protect society).
177 See Scott Bomboy, Why Does a Presidential Candidate Need to be 35 Years Old Anyway?,
CONST. DAILY (July 22, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/why-does-a-presidentialcandidate-need-to-be-35-years-old-anyway (describing the discussions that led to the
constitutional age restrictions for elective office).
178 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976) (“Since physical ability
generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age.”).
179 See Bernice L. Neugarten, Age Distinctions and Their Social Functions, 57 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 809, 821 (1981) (discussing a study that found that the vast majority of Illinois
statutory law concerned minors or those above fifty).
180 See Todd D. Nelson, Ageism: Prejudice Against Our Feared Future Self, 61 J. SOC.
ISSUES 207, 213–14 (2005) (discussing the psychological mechanisms at play in sustaining
ageism). This formulation of ageism relies on the concept of continuous personal identity, i.e.,
that the past or future self is indeed the same person as the one who holds the ageist attitude.
See, e.g., ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY
(1997) (arguing for continuity based on biology); see also Sydney Shoemaker, Personal
Identity: A Materialist’s Account, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 67, 89–91 (Sydney Shoemaker &
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understanding of ageism makes the application of an intent theory
to public discrimination less straightforward than it might at first
seem. From the perspective of intent and process, age-based
legislating appears to be less about inadequate representation of the
interests of other age groups in society at one moment in time and
more about the failure to represent our own past or future interests
across the lifecourse. In other words, age-based legislating merely
represents a lack of foresight or hindsight.181
Legislating against oneself, however, shows no defect of political
process. This is why affirmative action, which draws distinctions to
the detriment of the racial majority, is not troublesome from the
perspective of this egalitarian theory.182 The failure to think ahead
or remember our pasts is not unique to age-based rules either, so it
fails to provide a unique rationale for the moral wrongfulness of agebased distinctions in this context.183 These types of laws may still be
unwise or expose the problems with mental heuristics humans
employ, but these are separate prudential rather than moral
considerations.
2. Meaning
While an intent-based inquiry focuses on the process through
which differential treatment originates, objective meaning accounts
shift the emphasis to the differential treatment itself. What makes
discrimination wrongful is the demeaning message that such
Richard Swinburne eds., 1984) (advocating for psychological continuity); Ho Mun Chan,
Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and the Family, 18 BIOETHICS 87,
99–100 (2004) (favoring a relational view of personal identity). But see Derek Parfit, REASONS
AND PERSONS 205–12 (1984) (arguing that personal identity is more a matter of degree rather
than being an all-or-nothing affair). Despite this philosophical controversy, many legal
doctrines rely on the idea of continuous personal identity. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits
of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 854 (1990) (“Without unified personal identity, ‘new
persons’ could spring fully formed into existence and legitimately could deny all family and
financial obligations.”).
181 Cf EGLIT, supra note 68, at 17 (2004) (“These facts lead to the perception that those
people who possess power in American society are not likely to exercise that power to hurt
themselves today or their future selves tomorrow. . . .”).
182 See ELY, supra note 112, at 170–72 (discussing how affirmative action is not
troublesome from a process theory).
183 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995) (discussing failures in judgment of both
foresight and hindsight); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305 (1975) (discussing
hindsight bias).
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treatment might express in a particular context.184 To be
demeaning, a particular instance of differential treatment must
come from a person or entity that has power over the person to
whom it applies (the power dimension), and the treatment itself
must express extreme disrespect that does not acknowledge the
equal moral worth of the individual in cultural context (the social
dimension).185 The power dimension will easily be satisfied by public
discrimination because the government has power over its subjects,
and we can assume for the sake of argument that at least some
private actors will be in a position of power as well.
The analysis is more complicated for the social dimension. Agebased decision-making might at first seem to express extreme moral
disrespect. In the public realm, consider the various maturity rules
that grant legal rights to teenagers or those in their early
twenties.186 These rules deprive various individuals who might be
developmentally mature of the ability to have sex, contract, or vote
because they are just short of turning sixteen, eighteen, or twentyone.187 To those individuals who are developmentally mature but
have not yet reached the appropriate age, this could represent a
demeaning message that they are not full members of the
community.188 Similarly, a denial of services in the private realm on
the basis of age could send a similar message.189
It is not clear, however, how these types of age-based public rules
or private treatment can contain demeaning messages once one
evaluates them from the lifetime perspective. Since expressive
theories are heavily reliant on analyzing the relevant context to
determine if a message is demeaning, it is consistent with this

See supra Part I.B. (discussing the objective meaning accounts).
See HELLMAN, supra note 89, at 33 (“[D]emeaning is an inherently comparative
concept.”).
186 See Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1149–50 (2012) (detailing the
various types of maturity rules and their relationship with cultural constructs).
187 See supra Part I.A (describing various age-based rules).
188 This was the essence of the dispute in the early 1970s around reducing the voting age
to eighteen, so that it was consonant with the age of the military draft, which was highsalience due to the Vietnam War. See Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional
History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1358–59 (2003) (detailing the history).
189 See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 183, 263–64 (2011) (discussing how the Civil Rights Act was purposed towards avoiding
the demeaning nature of discrimination).
184
185
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approach to consider the temporal context as well.190 In the case of
maturity rules, minors will inevitably “age out” of these restrictions.
In the case of private age discrimination, the demeaning treatment
is temporally situated, such that it will not apply indefinitely and
will apply inevitably to all. Thus, when examined from the lifetime
perspective, treating individuals differently based on age merely
expresses that “This is not the appropriate time, yet” or “You are
currently the wrong age, but you were not before.” It is hard to
construe this message as inherently demeaning, provided there is
consistency in application of the differential treatment over time.
This is notably different from other identity characteristics, such as
sex, religion, or disability, which are not temporally dependent in
the same way.
3. Harm
Meaning-based
egalitarian
theories
of
discrimination
concentrate on the objective content of the discriminatory action,
but harm-based theories focus instead on their consequences.191
Law serves as a way of distributing resources or opportunities in
society, and it also serves to shape or reinforce oppressive cultural
attitudes and representations.192 The ruling in Murgia did both.193
It permitted the allocation of government positions, in that case
employment opportunities in law enforcement, to those who are
under age fifty.194 It also reinforced the stereotype that older people
are physically weak or incompetent.195 At first glance, this creates

190 See HELLMAN, supra note 89, at 38–41 (discussing the importance of considering context
in evaluating social meaning). Even if individuals do not typically think in lifetime terms
more generally, temporality inevitably enters into social understandings of age-based rules
and treatment due to age’s temporal dimension. In fact, the social tolerance of such
distinctions seems predicated on their being part of a structured life course that is equally
applied to all. Of course, this particular understanding is historically and culturally
contingent, which opens up the possibility that these age-based distinctions could be seen as
demeaning and morally wrongful under this theory in some other context.
191 See supra Part I.B. (describing harm-based theories).
192 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 92–93
(1996) (describing the mission of antidiscrimination law as ameliorating both distributive and
stigmatic harm).
193 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976).
194 Id.
195 See Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Joann M. Montepare, “Too Young, Too Old”: Stigmatizing
Adolescents and Elders, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 334, 338–344 (Todd F.
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an inequality between those who are over fifty and those who are
under fifty, on the basis of an immutable characteristic that does
not inherently have a relationship with the ability to do the job. To
the extent that we are egalitarians, it would seem that we should
view this type of age-based distinction with suspicion.
This first take, however, again fails to take a lifetime perspective.
As the Murgia Court points out, “old age” merely represents a
particular span of time within the lifecourse of an individual.196
Everyone will have the same opportunity to be a police officer
because everyone will have that opportunity for the same age range
in their lives. Everyone will experience the negative attitudes
towards age and aging when they reach the appropriate age, but not
before. In addition, they might experience positive age-based
stereotypes as well, such as the presumption of wisdom or
experience, indicating that travel through the lifecourse is not
necessarily a uniformly negative trajectory.197 When you compare
the access that two individuals might have to lifetime employment
opportunities in this field or the stigmatic effects that one might
experience over a lifetime, there is no difference. From an
egalitarian perspective, time serves to cure the negative effects of
the discrimination.
Those harm-based equality theories that focus on social groups,
rather than individuals, offer the possibility of avoiding the
temporal problems of age.198 These group-based theories of
discrimination locate the wrong of differential treatment in how it
affects social groups or society as a whole.199 Age groups do not
possess lifetimes, and it thus seems natural to evaluate whether
legal rules or private discrimination negatively affect certain groups
in society in a time-slice fashion.200
Heatherton et al. eds. 2003) (discussing how age stigmas affect both those who are older and
younger).
196 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–14.
197 See PALMORE, supra note 69, at 34–44 (discussing the positive stereotypes, attitudes,
and discrimination experienced by those who are older).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 122–23.
199 See Carina Fourie et al., The Nature and Distinctiveness of Social Equality: An
Introduction, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 1, 1 (Carina Fourie et
al. eds., 2015) (“When we appeal to the value of equality, we mean the value primarily of
egalitarian and nonhierarchical relationships . . . .”).
200 See Bidadanure, supra note 151, at 245 (arguing for a relational view when analyzing
inequalities between age groups).
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There are two primary problems with such an approach, one
specific to age and one not. First, as we all inevitably progress
through the lifecourse, any given group of individuals defined by age
is unstable as its membership is constantly and systematically
changing.201 People will always be naturally progressing into a
given age group (through birth or aging) and out of it (through
further aging or death). This is different from the changing
membership of other groups, which is either impossible due to
lifetime immutability, or occurs as a matter of choice or random
chance. Thus, age groups do not have the caste-like nature that
concerns group theorists.202
Second, it is not clear that group harms adequately capture or
exhaust the wrong of discrimination either morally or legally. This
is a critique that is not unique to age discrimination, though it takes
on special resonance when trying to assess moral wrongfulness. At
least some portion of the moral wrongfulness of discrimination
derives from a personal wrong, as the rest of the egalitarian theories
of discrimination recognize. For example, most understand the
denial of employment, housing, or medical care to a person on the
basis of her sex or class as being wrong not just because it
contributes to inequality between genders or classes writ large, but
also because it negatively impacts that individual.203 This is even
truer of age, as individuals have weaker ties to any given age group
as they continue to change group membership throughout their
lives. Put another way, discrimination is more tort-like in nature; it
constitutes a personal wrong by one person to another, or by the
government against its subjects.204 This is also typically how
201 See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 145, 177 (2000) (highlighting that the group logic of
antidiscrimination laws exacerbates tensions between distributive and recognition-based
forms of justice).
202 See Sunstein, supra note 132, at 2411–12 (describing “the anticaste principle,” which
forbids social and legal practices from “translating highly visible and morally irrelevant
differences into systemic social disadvantage” without good reason).
203 See Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 945–46 (2014)
(emphasizing the importance of the individual as well as the group in sex discrimination).
204 See Moreau, supra note 27, at 145–46 (“Anti-discrimination laws are commonly
structured in such a way as to suggest that discriminators have committed a personal wrong
against their victims, akin to a tort.”); see also William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About
the Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1032–33 (2014)
(describing the recent tendency of the Supreme Court to import tort concepts into
discrimination law).
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discrimination law has understood antidiscrimination rights—as
individual rather than group rights.205 This is not to suggest that
social or relational equality is not a worthy goal, but instead to
highlight the fact that the moral wrongfulness of discrimination
does not start or end with groups, even if they, too, might experience
harm through discrimination.
Egalitarian theories of discrimination alone provide insufficient
guidance in understanding the moral wrongfulness of age
discrimination. As a descriptive matter, this fact is illuminating, as
it helps explain the current state of constitutional age
discrimination jurisprudence, which is not protective of age.206 In
addition, there are powerful arguments why Equal Protection
jurisprudence should remain firmly rooted in equality rather than
in alternative values, such as liberty.207 However, the fact that an
age-based rule is constitutionally permissible does not absolve us of
the responsibility to analyze whether age discrimination is
wrongful, or whether legislatures or agencies should continue to
adopt age-based rules or enact antidiscrimination statutes. The
flurry of age-based antidiscrimination legislation after Murgia
suggests that there is some moral understanding that age
discrimination can be wrongful and that the law has a role to play
in policing it.208 The next Section examines how equality might be
able to justify the legal regulation of age discrimination in a limited
set of situations.

205 See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 141 (2017)
(“[Equality law] must recognize social groups to understand how group-based inequality
constrains individuals and harms society. But it does not envision social groups as the basic
units of analysis or the bearers of rights.”).
206 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (applying rational basis review
and upholding an age restriction).
207 See
Deborah Hellman, Equality and Unconstitutional Discrimination, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 51, 51 (“[A]n equality-based
conception of wrongful discrimination allows a court to decide cases on the basis of thinner
principles than does a liberty-based conception . . . and for that reason is more consistent with
liberal constitutionalism . . . .”).
208 See Howard Eglit, Mandatory Retirement, Murgia, and Ageism, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 259, 297–300 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (describing federal
legislative responses after Murgia).
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C. EQUALITY’S REMAINDERS

While age’s temporal dimension renders many egalitarian
theories of discrimination incapable of pinpointing the wrong of agebased discrimination, it is not the case that equality excuses all
forms of age-based discrimination. There are at least two situations
of age discrimination that equality may have the theoretical power
to identify as wrongful. However, even recognizing equality’s utility
in these cases, there are many forms of age discrimination that are
left unaddressed in an egalitarian scheme. Thus, current age-based
antidiscrimination law still requires a different or supplemental
theoretical foundation.
The first category is intersectional discrimination.209 In cases
where age intersects with other identity characteristics that do not
have the same temporal qualities as age, the lifetime perspective
does not complicate the egalitarian discrimination analysis.210 This
is because the discrimination will be anchored in more stable
identity characteristics, or ones that do not possess the same
inevitable mutability of age. As a result, several egalitarian theories
of discrimination will remain fully capable of explaining why these
types of discrimination are wrongful. For example, many states
have moved to decrease the age at which minors can be tried as
adults in criminal courts, with some going so far as to try children
at thirteen.211 To the extent that this has disproportionate racial
effects because such transfers operate in an environment in which
black children are seen as more mature and culpable, it is not a
neutral age-based distinction that will even out over the
lifecourse.212 The same can be said for raising the retirement age,

See supra text accompanying notes 81–85.
See, e.g., Alexandra Lopes, Aging and Social Class: Towards a Dynamic Approach to
Class Inequalities in Old Age, in AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DIVERSITY: MULTIPLE
DISCRIMINATION FROM AN AGE PERSPECTIVE 89, 101–05 (Malcolm Sargeant ed., 2011)
(discussing the intersection of class and age to produce cumulative disadvantage over the lifecourse).
211 See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 2016) (permitting prosecution of
thirteen year olds under certain conditions).
212 See REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’
CHILDHOOD
(2017),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wpcontent/uploades/sites/14/2017/08/girlhood-interrupted.pdf (demonstrating that black girls
are more likely to be “adultified” and that this has implications for the juvenile justice
system); Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
209
210
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which will have a disproportionate impact on certain racial
minorities and other groups.213 Thus, intersectional discrimination
will often show its wrongful character through the disparate impact
of facially neutral age rules.214
The second category is age-based discrimination that has the
effect of producing lifetime inequalities due to contextual factors.215
For example, while usually there is some degree of uncertainty
about the exact quality and quantity of the life that an individual
will have, sometimes the situation is more certain. This has the
effect of dissolving the unique temporal quality of age-based rules,
at least as applied in that specific case. To use an extreme case,
consider a terminally ill teenager who is developmentally quite
mature. This individual will have a tragically short life, and she will
be subject to a variety of maturity rules that continue to deprive her
of legal rights until she dies. She will not “age out” of her legal
disability, as most other minors will. In these situations, these agebased rules might take on a wrongful character because they
exacerbate lifetime inequalities. A more common situation would be
when a birth cohort experiences a particularly burdensome set of
material conditions—such as a depression or natural disaster—
such that formal equal legal treatment along several dimensions
would create unequal and morally unjust substantive outcomes
across a lifetime.216

Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 540 (2014) (finding that black boys
are seen as less childlike than their white peers).
213 See Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs
and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 607 (2001) (“[R]aising the Social Security retirement ages
is likely to have a greater adverse impact on groups with lower life expectancies, such as men,
blacks, and lower-income workers, than on groups with higher life expectancies, such as
women, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and higher-income workers.”).
214 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”).
215 See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986) (“Individual needs and positions
may have to be taken into account in any particular situation in order to achieve equality of
outcome.”).
216 See Thomas Nagel, Equality, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 60, 60 (Matthew Clayton &
Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (“It is a commonplace that real equality of every kind is sensitive
to economic factors.”); see also Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative
Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV. 324, 353 (2018) (“[T]reating individuals who are alike on one legally
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These examples partially rehabilitate egalitarian theories with
respect to age, as they help us understand the wrongfulness of
certain types of age discrimination. However, this is at best an
incomplete account of age discrimination as it leaves a large swath
of it unexplained. Something more is needed, either to replace or
complement egalitarian theories. The next Part explores how a noncomparative approach may offer a better descriptive and normative
foundation for the moral wrongfulness of age discrimination and
non-constitutional age discrimination law.
III. NON-COMPARATIVE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW
While the value of equality may both explain and justify the
current landscape of constitutional law with respect to age, it falters
in providing an adequate normative foundation for age-based
antidiscrimination norms or the statutory age discrimination law
that flows from them. This Part sketches out one version of a noncomparative age discrimination law—specifically one that is
grounded in liberty or freedom—which could serve as an alternative
or supplemental basis for the field.
Liberty is certainly not the only non-comparative value that one
could use to construct such a theory; another plausible candidate is
dignity.217 But the goal is neither to argue for any particular value
nor to elaborate all of the different aspects of a corresponding
theory. It is instead to demonstrate the contours of one such theory
in enough detail to show that it can serve as a plausible alternative
to equality-based accounts. In addition, this Part should not be
taken as an attempt to replace wholesale the value of equality in
age discrimination law. As noted earlier, equality still has some
explanatory force both normatively and descriptively for
salient dimension may not always be appropriate if the material conditions of those two
individuals are different.”).
217 See, e.g., Denise G. Reaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645, 666–71
(2003) (tracing the importance of dignity in Canadian discrimination jurisprudence). Dignity,
however, is a notoriously slippery concept that has less salience in United States law. See
Oscar Schachter, Comment, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848,
849 (1983) (noting that dignity’s “intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding,
conditioned in large measure by cultural factors”). That being said, depending on how you
define it, dignity may intersect in interesting ways with both liberty and equality in the
context of discrimination law. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions
and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007).
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constitutional law and for certain situations of age discrimination.
In fact, the best theory may be pluralist in nature, drawing on both
comparative and non-comparative values depending on the specific
context at issue.
In elaborating a liberty-based age discrimination law, this Part
seeks to answer two basic questions. First, how might one
conceptualize the relevant liberty interests in the context of
discrimination? Section A addresses this question. Second, since the
problems with the equality approach derive from age’s temporal
dimension, does liberty fare any better in this regard? Section B
tackles the relevant temporal issues. Finally, Section C discusses
some of the notable implications of a non-comparative age
discrimination theory for current debates in discrimination theory
and law.
A. LIBERTY

Liberty can have many meanings. At its core, it is concerned with
self-determination.218 This is the ability to author one’s own life,
choosing both what goals to value and the path to take in pursuit of
those goals.219 Beyond this, the consensus dissolves, but the
differences can be mapped in the following ways:
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in
question, it is always freedom from some constraint or
restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not
doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Such
freedom is thus always [1] of something (an agent or
agents), [2] from something, [3] to do, not do, become, or
not become something; it is a triadic relationship.220
Perhaps the most common construal of the value comes from
libertarian scholars, who understand it as negative freedom, or

218 See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988)
(understanding autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values”).
219 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.”).
220 Gerald C. MacCaullum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314
(1967) (emphasis in original).
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freedom from interference by the state.221 However, this conception
has little to say about what antidiscrimination norms we should
pursue, and legal scholars working in this vein have used this
understanding of liberty to critique the very types of
antidiscrimination laws that this Article seeks to justify.222 Thus, a
liberty-based antidiscrimination law must understand the value in
a different way.
A more robust understanding of liberty would conceptualize it as
a set of capabilities. A capability is the freedom of an agent to
achieve certain functionings, which encompass “doings,” or the
ability to do certain things (for example, to participate in the
political process or procure gainful employment), and “beings”, or
the ability to achieve certain states of being (for example, having
good health).223 These liberty interests are inherently open-ended,
as one is not required to exercise them to achieve the functionings
they facilitate.224
This implies a more comprehensive understanding of the
barriers that one might face in exercising one’s freedom. While the
government can certainly be a barrier to freedom, it is not the only
one. A given person’s capabilities are a “product of her internal
endowments, her external resources, and the social and physical
environment in which she lives.”225 Both private and public
discrimination impact the resources or opportunities that one
possesses as well as the legal environment that shapes one’s

221 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 1913,
203–06 (1969) (characterizing this as “negative liberty”). Several thinkers work in this vein.
See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
222 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 24–27 (1992) (valorizing freedom of contract and arguing that it is
antithetical to the antidiscrimination principle); id. at 443–48 (specifically attacking the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
223 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 89–96 (2000) (describing the concept of functionings).
224 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aging and Human Capabilities, in AGING THOUGHTFULLY:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 195, 196 (Martha
C. Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., 2017) (noting that capabilities form core political
entitlements and “with respect to what is on the list, what’s protected is an area of choice,
and people may choose one way or another”).
225 See Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in MEASURING
JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 81, 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns eds.,
2010).
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lifecourse. For example, private discrimination can cut off access to
markets for important goods, while governmental rules can restrict
access to legal entitlements that allow one to participate fully as a
citizen.226 This creates the need for an antidiscrimination regulatory
regime.
With the nature of the interest delineated, a further question
arises: which liberty interests, construed as capabilities, are worthy
of antidiscrimination protection? After all, not all capabilities are
created equal, nor should they be treated as such. For example, the
capability to dress in the most expensive fashions is not on par with
the capability to be nourished, even if they both implicate liberty
interests. Thus, we must have some understanding of which
capabilities are sufficiently important such that we must safeguard
them through antidiscrimination norms and law. Fortunately,
capabilities theorists have constructed comprehensive lists of
human capabilities that are fundamental to a flourishing life.227
However, a shorthand way of identifying those capabilities that are
sufficiently important is to look to current antidiscrimination law.
These laws, which prohibit discrimination in realms such as
employment and housing, identify those capabilities—seeking
employment or controlling one’s living situation—that are
important enough to receive the protection of the law.228
Having described liberty and its relationship to discrimination
law, a further question arises: what makes discrimination morally
wrongful from a liberty perspective? There are several possibilities.
First, one might find the wrong of discrimination in how it impairs
an individual’s deliberative freedoms, or the ability to conceptualize
and actualize a plan for the good life in domains considered

226 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1250–53
(2013) (describing how legal rules can serve to cut one off from fundamental human
capabilities in the context of legal incapacity).
227 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 76–78 (detailing a list of ten fundamental
capabilities, including life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought;
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment
(political and material)); KHAITAN, supra note 63, at 95–96 (arguing that four goods are
essential to the pursuit of a good life and that the role of discrimination law is to ensure their
availability: goods to satisfy one’s biological needs, negative freedom, an adequate range of
valuable opportunities, and self-respect).
228 See supra notes 10–12.
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important.229 The key normative point here is that certain morally
irrelevant traits should not factor into an individual’s life plans as
costs.230 For example, one should not have to contemplate one’s sex
as a cost in deciding where to work. Certain workplaces may impose
such costs by allowing sexual harassment or maintaining a sexbased wage differential.231 Age similarly constitutes a morally
irrelevant characteristic that should not operate as a cost through
the decision-making of others, even if the aging process certainly
imposes costs of various types.232
An alternative is to understand the moral wrong of
discrimination in terms of the right to be treated as an individual.233
In this framing, discrimination is morally wrongful because it
zeroes in on one facet of an individual, ignoring other relevant
information about how she has structured her life in the past or how
she will make autonomous decisions in accordance with a life plan
in the future.234 This is a salient concern with age discrimination
against those who are older because there is comparatively more
relevant information about an individual’s past choices that might
be ignored through focusing solely on age. In contrast, age
discrimination against those who are younger may be particularly
229 See Moreau, supra note 27, at 147 (“In a liberal society, . . . we are each entitled to a set
of ‘deliberative freedoms,’ freedoms to deliberate about and decide how to live in a way that
is insulated from pressures stemming from extraneous traits of ours.”); see also NUSSBAUM,
supra note 26, at 77 (describing the fundamental capability of practical reason, or “[b]eing
able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of
one’s life”).
230 See Moreau, supra note 27, at 149 (“[T]here are certain traits that we believe people
should not have to factor into their deliberations, or, more exactly, should not have to factor
in as costs, even if they are deeply important to the person and relevant to her decisions.”);
see also Alan Carter, A Distinction Within Egalitarianism, 108 J. PHIL. 535, 536 (2011) (“[W]e
hold as a basic moral principle that persons ought to be treated equally unless there is a
morally significant and morally relevant difference between them that justifies unequal
treatment.” (footnotes omitted)).
231 See Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay
Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 187–88 (2011) (discussing how
preconceived notions can inappropriately influence the estimated worth of female employees).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
233 See
Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 203, 204 (“To treat someone respectfully as an
individual, I suggest, is essentially to treat her as an autonomous being—that is, as a person
who can meaningfully author her own life, and who is, as a result, partly of her own making.”).
234 See id. at 227 (“Central among the various moral problems with much discrimination is
a distinctive failure . . . to treat him as in part a product of his own past efforts at self-creation,
and as an autonomous agent whose future choices are his own to make.”).
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concerning because it ignores the individual’s role in constructing a
life path for years to come.
A third way of conceptualizing the non-comparative wrong of
discrimination is to focus on opportunity “bottlenecks.”235 A
bottleneck in the opportunity structure of society is a situation in
which there is only one plausible path towards achieving certain
desired functionings.236 For example, if performing well on a
standardized test were the only determinant of one’s job
opportunities and earning potential (rather than being just an entry
point into one specific profession), that represents a bottleneck.237
Such bottlenecks deprive individuals of multiple potential paths to
achieve certain desired functionings and thus hinders the creation
of a unique life plan. Identity characteristics can also serve as
bottlenecks.238 For instance, an employer might require that
employees possess no mobility impairments to stay on the job, even
if it is irrelevant to doing the job.239 This is a bottleneck based on
disability, and age can serve as a bottleneck in the same way to
prevent opportunity pluralism. According to this view,
discrimination is wrongful when it creates bottlenecks that inhibit
the acquisition of important functionings through multiple paths.240
B. THE TEMPORAL QUESTION

However it is conceptualized, liberty is a plausible basis for
understanding the moral wrong of discrimination and for justifying
an age-based antidiscrimination regime. But how does it fare with
respect to age’s temporal dimension? Liberty is a non-comparative
value; these types of values protect rights or interests that are

235 See FISHKIN, supra note 28, at 146 (advocating for an anti-bottleneck principle: “As far
as possible, there should be a plurality of paths leading to the valued roles and goods, without
bottlenecks through which one must pass in order to reach them.”).
236 See id. at 13 (defining a bottleneck as “a narrow place in the opportunity structure
through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals”).
237 See id. at 130–31 (stating that standardized tests can represent a bottleneck).
238 See id. at 232 (listing those identity characteristics that antidiscrimination laws
address).
239 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
441 (2000) (describing how the design of jobs or the physical environment may disadvantage
people with disabilities).
240 See id. at 16 n.38 (suggesting that societies should avoid discrimination that creates
bottlenecks in the market).
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independent of the rights or interests of others.241 Instead of
focusing on a comparison to another individual, non-comparative
approaches instead examine the rights or interests that one might
have by virtue of some quality that the individual possesses, such
as being human or a recognized member of a community.242 In other
words, these interests are intrinsic to the person and create a
baseline of treatment to which one is entitled.243 Because it does not
rely on comparisons, a non-comparative approach avoids the basic
temporal question of equality-based approaches, which is when the
comparison must occur.
Instead, it has its own analogous temporal question that it must
answer. This is whether the relevant liberty interests must be
protected during an entire lifetime or only at certain moments
during the lifecourse. A logical preliminary answer is that the
liberty interests must be protected at all times.244 The law already
recognizes that self-authorship is a continuous process, and that we
retain the intrinsic right to change our goals and the means we use
to reach those goals. For example, self-binding contracts do not have
the force of law, as they bind a future self to a life plan generated by
a past self.245 Similarly, wills can be written and rewritten as many
241 See Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (“[J]ustice
consists in giving a person his due, but in some cases one’s due is determined independently
of that of other people, while in other cases, a person’s due is determinable only by reference
to his relations to other persons. I shall refer to contexts, criteria, and principles of the former
kind as noncomparative, and those of the latter sort as comparative.” (emphasis in original)).
A liberty-based model of discrimination law may nonetheless retain some comparative
elements, as certain desired goods may be relative in character or the relative position of
groups may guide who the law prioritizes. See KHAITAN, supra note 63, at 113–15.
242 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 36 (2011) (proposing that such capabilities inhere in a notion of life worthy of
human dignity); Hellman, supra note 207, at 55 (“According to discrimination as a violation
of liberty, a law or policy wrongfully discriminates when it infringes on a liberty to which each
person is independently entitled. The problem is not that person X is being treated worse
than person Y, without adequate justification. Rather, the problem is that person X is being
denied a right to which she is entitled, period.” (emphasis in original)).
243 Thus, this version of antidiscrimination law adopts sufficiency, rather than equality, as
a moral ideal. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 134
(1988) (positing that “what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone
have the same but that each should have enough” (emphasis omitted)).
244 See Bou-Habib, supra note 158, at 302–03 (arguing against time-limited autonomy); see
also supra Part III.C.2.
245 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 19–21 (noting that Ulysses contracts are not
enforceable); Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 357, 359
(1985) (“We have, then, a territory in which ‘private ordering’ is about all there is. We must
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times as one pleases, as death is the only logical end to the selfauthorship process.246 Thus, in a liberty-based scheme, the moral
wrong of discrimination derives from the deprivation of sufficientlyimportant capabilities rather than the comparison of one’s legal or
social entitlements to those of another.247 This forms the normative
basis of age-based antidiscrimination law, a task for which equality
is ill-suited.
One important conceptual implication of this is that a libertybased theory of discrimination embraces a critical stance toward a
socially or legally prescribed life course. In other words, the
pathways that one might take in pursuit of one’s life goals should
not be dictated by age, and certain opportunities should not be
foreclosed solely because of age. For example, according to this view,
adoption of children should not necessarily be limited to those of a
certain age, allowing flexibility in when to pursue parenthood
during one’s lifecourse.248 The healthy skepticism about externallyimposed life paths is not that alien a concept, as this type of libertybased norm is already reflected in employment discrimination law,
which has over time removed any age ceiling on the class of
employees protected from age discrimination.249 This is in notable
contrast to European age discrimination law, which more willingly
embraces mandatory retirement and a particular life stage in which
one retires and receives a relatively generous pension.250
devise rules for our own behavior that entail little or no reliance on the courts . . . because the
courts refuse to extend us their jurisdiction.”). It is also the reason why contracts to sell
oneself into slavery are prohibited, as they inhibit future liberty interests to too great a
degree. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 953 (J. M. Robson ed.,
1965) (explaining the problem with contracts in perpetuity).
246 See, e.g., Matter of Fernandez’s Estates, 413 A.2d 998, 1002 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980) (“A will is ambulatory and speaks only as of testator’s death.”).
247 See Richard Wagland, A Fair Innings or a Complete Life: Another Attempt at an
Egalitarian Justification of Ageism, in JUSTICE FOR OLDER PEOPLE 161, 170 (Harry Lesser
ed. 2012) (concluding that “an effective anti-ageist argument should appeal to the idea that
there are certain synchronic interests that have equal moral value irrespective of the
chronological age of the individual who holds them”).
248 See, e.g., Kerry O’Halloran, The Legal Functions of Adoption, 41 IUS GENTIUM 79, 87
(2015) (noting that most Western countries include in suitability criteria a maximum age for
adoption).
249 See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-592, §2(c)
(1986) (removing the age ceiling of the ADEA, which had been previously set at 70).
250 See Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in
the United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 90–97 (2012) (comparing the legal
treatment of mandatory retirement in the United States and Europe).
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The presumption against a prescribed life course does not
necessarily mean that we must reject all social or cultural
understandings of life stages or a “normal” lifecourse. Many of these
could be justified in the name of preserving liberty for others or for
oneself at some other point in the lifecourse, promoting efficiency,
or honoring some other important competing value. For instance, in
certain situations, it makes sense for some activities to take place
in a sequence, such as attending law school before becoming a
practicing attorney or engaging in cycles of rest and work.251 The
key is that when the culture or law sets down an age-based
expectation or rule, there must be a more searching inquiry to see if
it is truly justified or not. The next Section explores some ways in
which that might play out with respect to discrimination law and
theory.
C. IMPLICATIONS

One of the qualities of a good theory is that it proves fruitful.252
It should expand our understanding of a particular phenomenon,
and a legal theory ideally should also provide guidance for the
structure of the law.253 The non-comparative approach suggested by
this Article has already proven fruitful in understanding age
discrimination law in light of age’s unique temporal qualities as well
as in justifying the current range of age-based antidiscrimination
statutes. This Section explores some additional ways in which this
approach might shed light on various phenomena, specifically in the
areas of discrimination theory, age-based distinctions in the law,
and antidiscrimination statutes.
1. Discrimination Theory
The field of discrimination law lacks a consensus normative
foundation, and a nascent debate has arisen over the value or values

See Gosseries, supra note 134, at 70–71 (discussing the rationale of sequence efficiency).
See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC
TRADITION AND CHANGE 321–22 (1977) (describing the five characteristics of accuracy,
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness as desirable aspects of a theory).
253 See id. at 322.
251
252
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that undergird the domain.254 Monists believe that a single value
forms its normative foundation, though they disagree on whether it
is equality, liberty, dignity, or something else entirely.255 As noted
earlier, the dominant value is equality, even if theorists understand
it differently in the discrimination context.256 In contrast, pluralists
believe that multiple values are at play, and the correct approach is
to determine which values operate in a particular context.257
Finally, there are those who reject the theoretical enterprise
entirely, believing the area of discrimination law is hopelessly
theoretically incoherent.258
Within the monist debate, this Article scores some points for noncomparative values such as liberty as compared with equality, since
the former have more explanatory power with respect to age.259
However, it does not necessarily follow that the monists are correct.
There may be a valuable intellectual division of labor between the
various values in explaining and justifying different portions of
antidiscrimination law, in two ways. First, equality retains
explanatory and justificatory power for characteristics other than
age, such as race or sex.260 Nothing in this Article weakens
equality’s claims on those areas of discrimination law.
Second, equality has been useful for explaining portions of age
discrimination law as well. The temporal analysis introduced in this
Article fleshes out how equality underlies the weak constitutional
protection for age.261 Equality also has the theoretical capacity to
See Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 1 (noting that the philosophical discussion of issues in
discrimination is a “relatively young field of inquiry”).
255 See KHAITAN, supra note 63, at 6 (“Despite the urgency of the challenge [of finding a
normative foundation for discrimination law], theoretical consensus has so far eluded
scholars. Candidate theories can (very roughly) be classified into three broad categories:
egalitarian, liberal, and dignitarian.”); Hellman, supra note 20, at 899–900 (discussing the
battle between comparative and non-comparative values in Equal Protection jurisprudence).
256 See supra Part I.B.
257 See Lawrence Blum, Racial and Other Asymmetries: A Problem for the Protected
Categories Framework for Anti-Discrimination Thought, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION LAW 182, 188 (listing seven classes of wrongmaking features that can all
serve to justify the moral wrongfulness of discrimination).
258 See George Rutherglen, Concrete or Abstract Conceptions of Discrimination?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 115, 122–29 (arguing against
“conceptual ascent” as theory probably cannot make sense of discrimination law).
259 See supra Part III.A.
260 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 206–208.
254
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decry intersectional age discrimination, discrimination in the
context of varying social conditions, and discrimination that hinders
a group-based social or relational equality.262 A non-comparative
approach, in turn, highlights reasons for relying less on age-based
rules as a matter of legislative discretion, as well as for
promulgating age-based antidiscrimination statutes. Thus, while
this Article argues that the moral wrongfulness of age
discrimination is best grounded in non-comparative values, it
embraces a more pluralistic outlook with regard to age
discrimination law and discrimination theory more generally.
Further, it suggests that those who consider the field of
discrimination law to be conceptually incoherent have not yet
exhausted the more nuanced theoretical possibilities.
2. Age-Based Law
Because age-based distinctions are only subject to rational basis
review, the government has relatively free reign in employing age
in the law.263 However, the Court has not addressed age-based
distinctions in some time.264 Further, the Court has gradually
blurred its tiers of scrutiny and seems more willing to accept hybrid
Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process claims.265 Thus,
there may be doctrinal space to present an argument for some form
of heightened scrutiny with regard to age, at least in some

See supra Part II.C.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64 (2000) (“[A] State may rely on age as a
proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate
interests. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.”).
264 The last time the Court took up age distinctions in the law was in Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93 (1979). Thus, Murgia cannot claim the status of “super precedent.” Michael J.
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006) (“Super precedents are the
doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but not
always in more than one area of constitutional law).”).
265 See e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97
B.U. L. REV. 425, 455 (2017) (“Although it is often overlooked, one can find many other cases
that involve a ‘hybrid’ or double helix equal protection/due process analysis.”); Pamela S.
Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[S]ometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—
through the lenses of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have
synergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”); Julie A. Nice,
The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the CoConstitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1222–24 (1999) (arguing
that rights and classifications are interdependent, rather than separate and isolated).
262
263
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contexts.266 This is not to say that the Court is likely to accept such
an argument any time soon, but instead to suggest that such an
argument is not theoretically foreclosed, even if practically it might
be.267
This raises the question of how this Article might help or hinder
such arguments. The short answer is that it might do both. On the
one hand, by elaborating on the truncated equality analysis in
Murgia, it provides a firmer moral foundation for the implicit
lifetime egalitarianism that animates a rational basis level of
review. On the other hand, by demonstrating that an alternative
moral foundation for the wrongfulness of age discrimination might
be found in non-comparative values, it lends normative strength to
hybrid class/rights claims involving age and a significant rights
infringement.268
Assuming that rational basis is likely entrenched for the
moment, the moral case against age discrimination laid out in this
Article can only act as guidance to legislators and administrative
officials who might contemplate using age-based rules. In short, the
guidance is this: age distinctions are morally suspect, and age
should be treated as a disfavored legal criterion. Thus, absent other
moral or practical concerns, age-based legal distinctions in
important social domains should be avoided.269 I offer some
266 See Kohn, supra note 16, at 231–55 (critiquing the reasoning in Murgia and arguing for
intermediate scrutiny of classifications that affect those who are older); Eglit, supra note 40
at 903–07 (arguing for five “postulates” that would guide judicial evaluation of age
distinctions, as opposed to applying a particular tier of scrutiny); Martin Lyon Levine,
Comments on the Constitutional Law of Age Discrimination, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1081, 1100
(1981) (arguing that “the constitutionality of age discrimination may properly be regarded as
not yet settled by holding”).
267 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757 (2011) (“[T]he
last classification accorded heightened scrutiny by the Supreme Court was that based on
nonmarital parentage in 1977. At least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence,
this canon has closed.” (footnote omitted)).
268 See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1135 (2004) (“In cases
where the Court has confronted claims of not-quite-deprivation of liberty, as experienced by
persons in not-quite-suspect classes, it has in practice displayed a willingness to take into
account a kind of cross-doctrinal cumulative weighting of the interests involved and the
consequences of adverse legal treatment.”).
269 In other words, this Article does not suggest that all age-based distinctions should be
abolished, and there are no doubt compelling arguments in some cases for their retention.
For example, some might find mandatory retirement rules attractive because they avoid a
more personalized and potentially humiliating finding that one has been rendered incapable
due to age. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 977 (1995). Others
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preliminary thoughts on how this guidance might be applied in two
important contexts: maturity rules for minors and public benefits
rules for adults.
Given that a liberty-based theory of age discrimination values
liberty interests across the lifecourse, it might at first seem difficult
to reconcile such a non-comparative theory with the large body of
maturity rules. These rules discriminate against minors on the
basis of age by depriving them of certain liberty-based entitlements
that would almost certainly be included in one’s conception of a
flourishing life. In other words, does a non-comparative theory of
age discrimination law require the abolition of age-based maturity
rules, or can they still be justified?
For three reasons, many of these rules would survive inspection.
First, many maturity rules operate to safeguard one’s capability set
across the lifecourse. For example, granting the right to have sex at
too early an age may have significant consequences, such as
pregnancy or sexually transmitted infections, which will seriously
impact the capability sets that one might enjoy later in life.270 This
type of rationale was at play with California’s recently-passed
“Eraser Law,” which requires websites to delete upon request
content that is posted by minors, as a way of preventing it from
haunting them later as adults.271
Second, adults possess a liberty interest in raising their children
as they see fit.272 Thus, maturity rules must balance parents’ liberty
interests in this important domain against the emerging liberty
interests of their children. The law of child emancipation is the area

might find more persuasive the arguments that this is an outcome worth risking as it allows
individuals to pursue employment at a time that is in line with a unique life plan.
270 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1218
(2015) (discussing some of the consequences of sexual activity in the context of adult
incapacity).
271 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (West 2013) (requiring Internet-related entities to
“[p]ermit a minor . . . to request and obtain removal of, content or information posted on the
operator’s Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application by the
user.”). This law has been subject to extensive criticism for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Eric
Goldman, California’s New ‘Online Eraser’ Law Should be Erased, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013,
1:35PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/09/24/californias-new-onlineeraser-law-should-be-erased/#5d53bbdf7a33 (discussing how “[t]he law is riddled with
ambiguities,” such as it being “unclear about when the minor can exercise the removal right”).
272 See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 438–45 (2006) (discussing
the role of parental rights in constitutional jurisprudence).
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in which this plays out most explicitly.273 While the balancing of
liberty interests might occur in other contexts, this conflict is
inherent and heightened in the parent-child relationship. How
individuals’ different liberty interests intersect and conflict will be
a recurring issue in the application of a liberty-based theory to
discrimination law. Fortunately, such balancing is not a new issue,
and several liberal theories of societal organization have grappled
with how to resolve it.274
Third, the right to self-determination is at least partially reliant
on possessing the mental or physical capacities to exercise it. Agebased distinctions are blunt attempts to calibrate the liberty
granted by certain rights to those presumed capacities.275 The
validity of such calibrations, in turn, relies on scientific
understandings of developmental capacity across the population as
a whole.276 There is some evidence that the particular age cutoffs
employed by several maturity rules are in fact incorrect and should
be changed, but the existence of some age cutoff can be morally
justified.277 A similar calibration would not be appropriate with
respect to old age, given the greater diversity of the aging process,
even if there might be capacity issues created by conditions such as
dementia in individual cases.278

273 See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267
(1995) (reviewing the history of the children’s rights movements).
274 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980)
(explaining the author’s object “to persuade you that the liberal tradition is best understood
as precisely such an effort to define and justify broad constraints on power talk”); RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985) (arguing that “liberalism takes . . . [a]
conception of equality” that “supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible,
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life”).
275 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055,
1095–96 (2010) (“The immature have an interest in exercising those specific liberties of which
they are capable. Determining which liberties they are capable of exercising, however, can
present any number of difficulties—even where researchers have identified normative
capacities, for example, there will be individuals whose capacities vary from the norm.”).
276 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 816–17 (2005) (noting that while developmental
pathways differ, there are some generalizations that can be made).
277 See Elizabeth S. Scott et. al., Young Adulthood As A Transitional Legal Category:
Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 646–653 (2016)
(critically examining neurobiological evidence and how it relates to criminal law’s treatment
of younger offenders).
278 See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra note 270, at 1234–35 (proposing a legal test for dealing with
dementia in the sexual consent context).
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Another area in which skepticism of age-based distinctions will
have an outsized impact is in the law governing public benefits.279
In this context, age is used to target populations that may have
specific needs.280 For example, the provision of the Affordable Care
Act that allows individuals to stay on their parents’ health
insurance until they are twenty-six addresses the lack of health
insurance among this group.281 Similarly, Social Security rules only
allow the collection of retirement benefits in one’s sixties, which
addresses the need for income support among this likely retired
set.282 Both of these distinctions, and others, are called into question
based on the normative guidance described above. The rationales
employed to justify maturity rules are also largely inapplicable in
these cases.
This could nudge the law in one of two directions. First, it could
lead the government to rely on need, rather than age, as the legal
criterion of choice. While this would theoretically achieve more
accurate targeting than age, such means-testing has significant
disadvantages. It is costly to operate, stigmatizes benefits
recipients, and puts such programs in a politically precarious
situation.283 Second, the abandonment of age could lead to the
adoption of more universalist approaches.284 For example, instead
of using age or need as the way of maintaining income support
programs, one could pursue a basic income—unconditional cash
transfers to all citizens or residents not conditioned on personal
characteristics.285 Universalist policies tend to be more expensive
279 See Elizabeth A. Kutza & Nancy R. Zweibel, Age as a Criterion for Focusing Public
Programs, in AGE OR NEED?: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 55, 82–91 (Bernice
Neugarten ed., 1982) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using age for
allocation of social resources).
280 See id (noting that there is a strong correlation between increased age and increased
dependency).
281 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2012).
282 What is Full Retirement Age?, 20 C.F.R. § 404.409 (2015).
283 See Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 745 (1991) (noting various problems with means-testing).
284 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008) (arguing that vulnerability is a
“universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of
our concept of social and state responsibility”).
285 See Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First
Century, in REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS
CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 3, 4 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2006) (defining
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but also more politically sustainable.286 Regardless of which option
is chosen, disfavoring age as a basis for public law distinctions will
require an analysis of the different policy options for accomplishing
the goals previously achieved by age.
3. Antidiscrimination Statutes
While a non-comparative approach would view age-based
distinctions in the public sphere with skepticism, it would likely
welcome further statutory regulation of private discriminatory
conduct on the basis of age. As a preliminary matter, this would
mean including age in the host of antidiscrimination statutes in
which it is not present, such as the Fair Housing Act.287 The
argument for inclusion in other antidiscrimination statutes depends
on the importance of the domain in question as well as any
countervailing moral or practical concerns.288
Once age is included in a statutory scheme, a non-comparative
approach also provides guidance for how to structure the statute.289
For example, consider the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and the quality of symmetry.290 The symmetry principle “mandates
that once certain attributes or characteristics are identified as
worthy of antidiscrimination protection, all groups within that

a basic income as “an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual
basis, without means test or work requirement”); see also Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel
Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for A Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1270–
71 (making a libertarian argument for basic income).
286 See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 28 (1990)
(“All benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.”).
287 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2016) (including a variety of identity categories but omitting
age).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 134–36.
289 This is not to say that non-comparative approaches must permeate all aspects of
antidiscrimination statutes and doctrine. For example, comparative approaches will likely
prove indispensable in establishing proof of disparate impact. See, e.g., Mark B. Seidenfeld,
Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1083, 1095–96 (1982) (describing the comparable worth approach to establishing
disparate impact in sex discrimination cases).
290 See, e.g., Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017
WIS. L. REV. 69, 121 (arguing for symmetry); Blum, supra note 257, at 185–87 (arguing for
asymmetry); see also John E. Morrison, Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Difference
Dilemma, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 976 n.19 (1994) (collecting scholarly analysis of how courts
shift between symmetrical and asymmetrical analysis depending on the issue).
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universal ground must be protected.”291 Symmetry in discrimination
law has typically been analyzed using the lens of equality and
debated primarily in the context of affirmative action, a race-based
asymmetrical policy.292 The unequal harm suffered by one side of
the protected category justifies the pro-asymmetry position, while
symmetry is often favored because it avoids the legal reinforcement
of potentially-pernicious social categories.293
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is asymmetrical in
two ways. It only protects those over the age of forty,294 and the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Act does not prohibit
discrimination against younger members of that protected class in
favor of older ones.295 A liberty-based analysis underscores the
moral dimension of asymmetry and shows its faults. To the extent
that the wrong of age discrimination in employment is that it
infringes on an intrinsic interest that we all possess, the
asymmetrical structure of age-based antidiscrimination laws does
not withstand muster. Further, as an empirical matter, the young
also suffer from age discrimination in employment.296 This counsels
in favor of removing the age floor and requiring equal treatment for
all members of the protected class.
This Section has demonstrated that a non-comparative theory of
discrimination law is not only theoretically valuable, but also
generative in the realms of legal theory and law reform. While the
practical reforms suggested here would have to contemplate the

291 Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (2017)
(emphasis omitted).
292 See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 401–08 (1989)
(discussing how Supreme Court justices draw on different concepts, including symmetry, to
justify their stances toward affirmative action).
293 Compare Areheart, supra note 291, at 1123–29 (arguing that asymmetry is permissible
when traits are not universal and there exists a subordinated group) with Mary Anne Case,
“The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest
for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 (2000) (arguing that in the context of
sex discrimination, symmetry assists in eliminating sex stereotypes).
294 See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”).
295 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (“The question in
this case is whether [the ADEA] . . . prohibits favoring the old over the young. We hold it does
not.”).
296 See Susan Bisom-Rapp & Malcolm Sargeant, Diverging Doctrine, Converging Outcomes:
Evaluating Age Discrimination Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 44 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 717, 741–42 (2013) (describing discrimination against the young).
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range of practical objections as well as moral considerations
deriving from other values, that conversation is likely to be more
focused and productive.
CONCLUSION
Age is unique. No other identity characteristic has a similar
relationship with time, and the implications of its temporal
character are significant for the normative foundation of age
discrimination law. As a descriptive matter, a non-comparative
value such as liberty is better suited to explain non-constitutional
age discrimination law. As a normative matter, such a value
foundation has the conceptual resources to identify the moral wrong
of age discrimination and justify the current age-based
antidiscrimination law regime, whereas equality does not. It further
generates insights that deepen our understanding of several
controversies in discrimination law and theory. This Article thus
leaves us in a better position to evaluate the morality of age-based
distinctions and proposals for law reform.
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